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Legislative Epidemics:
A Cautionary Tale of Criminal Laws that
Have Swept the Country
CATHERINE L. CARPENTER†
INTRODUCTION
Epidemic. The word conjures up thoughts of a virus that
spreads from one part of the country to the other. It might
even be used to describe a sweeping change in social
behavior. But can it be used to describe the passage of laws?
Aided by Malcolm Gladwell’s instructive work, The Tipping
Point,1 this Article argues that legislation can take hold and
† Professor of Law, Southwestern Law School. I wish to thank Dean Bryant
Garth of Southwestern Law School, Vice Dean Austen Parrish, and Professor
Ron Aaronovsky for support of my scholarship. I am grateful for the valuable
feedback I received from Professors Karen Smith, J. Kelly Strader, and Dennis
Yokoyoma, and for the research assistance of Suzanne Holden, Erika Shao, and
Rolland Gutierrez, and for the dedication and personal effort of Jonathan
Lamberti, Editor-in-Chief of the Buffalo Law Review. I would also like to
acknowledge two scholars—Wayne Logan and Corey Rayburn Yung—for their
clear and impassioned writing on the concern over the constitutionality of sex
offender registration laws. Finally, my heartfelt appreciation to my family for
their encouragement of this project.
1. MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT (2000). This bestselling work on
social phenomena has been cited in other legally-related topics. See, e.g., Mary
Jane Angelo, Harnessing the Power of Science in Environmental Law: Why We
Should, Why We Don’t, and How We Can, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1527, 1552-69 (2008)
(employing “tipping point” analysis to explain why some scientific ideas catch on
and others do not); Jean M. Holcomb, Got Ideas? 100 LAW LIBR. J. 587, 588-91
(2008) (discussing the “stickiness” of ideas); Leo Martinez, Tax Policy, Rational
Actors, and Other Myths, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 297, 318 (2009) (using “tipping
point” analysis to discuss whether the public is properly informed about
overarching tax policies); Jed S. Ela, Comment, Law and Norms in Collective
Action: Maximizing Social Influence to Minimize Carbon Emissions, 27 UCLA J.
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multiply across the country in much the same way that a
medical outbreak becomes a pandemic,2 or a piece of
clothing turns into the “must-have” item of the season.3
We have all witnessed the cycle. An issue is identified;
there is a rise in public awareness and a ramping up of
rhetoric, and then a flurry of legislation is passed to combat
the problem.4
In this Article, I reconstruct the series of forces, both
legal and social, that conflate to produce the “legislative
epidemic.”5 Using Gladwell’s “tipping point” analysis, Part I
offers a primer on the epidemiology of an epidemic, in both
the medical and social contexts. This part analyzes three
factors that generally control an epidemic’s rise: (1) the core
group of people who transmit the agent; (2) the nature of
the agent itself; and (3) the other causes that contribute to
its spread.
But these attributes are not relegated only to the
medical or social epidemic. Using the same factors, Part II
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 93, 109 nn.56-57 (2009) (using “tipping point” analysis to
argue that social norms can shape group behaviors).
2. See, e.g., GLADWELL, supra note 1, at 15-19 (examining the syphilis
epidemic in Baltimore); AIDS Educational Global Information System,
Timeline: A Brief History of AIDS/HIV, http://www.aegis.com/topics/timeline
(last visited Dec. 6, 2009) [hereinafter AEGIS] (providing the historical
development of the outbreak of HIV/AIDS); see also infra notes 15-21 and
accompanying text (analyzing the 2009 H1N1 medical epidemic).
3. The prominent example Gladwell raises concerns Hush Puppies, a brand
of shoes, which increased sales from 30,000 to 430,000 pairs in one year. See
GLADWELL, supra note 1, at 3-5. For discussion of other “must-have” items, see,
for example, Beanie Babies, Bad Fads, http://www.badfads.com/pages/collectib
les/beanie-babies.html (last visited Dec. 6, 2009), for details of the dramatic rise
in sales in the 1990s of “beanie babies,” small stuffed animals; and infra note 43,
for sources that describe the frenzy connected to Tickle Me Elmo, the “musthave” toy of 1996.
4. See infra Part II (exploring the impetus for passage of laws on drinking
and drunk-driving, Three Strikes, the duty to rescue, and sex offender
registration).
5. See infra Part II (examining legislative epidemics in drunk driving, three
strikes, and sex offender registration); see also Sana Loue, Elder Abuse and
Neglect in Medicine and Law, 22 J. LEGAL MED. 159, 172-86 (2001) (tracking the
various criminal statutes enacted to combat elder abuse); J. Kelly Strader,
Criminalization as a Policy Response to a Public Health Crisis, 27 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 435 (1994) (reviewing the HIV/AIDS criminal transmission statutes that
were enacted in response to the AIDS crisis).
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deconstructs the legislative epidemic. Showcasing a variety
of criminal legislation, including laws on drunk driving,
Three Strikes, and sex offender registration, this part
explores the core group of people responsible for their
passage, the tragic stories that galvanized the public, and
the legal and political factors that contribute to their
expansion. In some cases, the resulting legislation is a
reasoned response to a perceived gap in the criminal law,
and its epidemic rise provides a framework of language for a
national conversation on the issue. Changes in drunk
driving laws during the 1980s,6 or recent restrictions on cell
phone use while driving,7 demonstrate appropriate
legislative reactions to the recognized tip of problems.8
However, the Article is also a cautionary tale about
legislative epidemics fueled by high-profile cases, emotionladen rhetoric, and inaccurate, but embedded, assumptions
about crime and criminals. Part III argues that the same set
of forces responsible for the dramatic spread of a law also
makes legislative epidemics particularly vulnerable to
systemic failures that include runaway legislation,
prohibitive costs, and failed execution. And like a medical
epidemic whose virology changes over time, legislative
epidemics are also susceptible to mutation, where
succeeding generations of law prove to be more aggressive
than the original legislation. Awareness of these failings
sounds a call to action, and this Article offers guidance to
lawmakers and courts on their needed responses.

6. See infra Part II (portraying the forces responsible for the change in the
laws); see also infra notes 65-76 and accompanying text (discussing the changes
in laws).
7. Called “Distracted Driving” Laws, fourteen states prohibit texting while
driving and other states require “hands-free” use of cell phones while driving.
See DrivingLaws.org, Hands Free, Text Messaging, and Cell Phone Driving
Laws, http://www.drivinglaws.org/indexhf.php (last visited Dec. 6, 2009).
8. Interestingly, there has already been a backlash to the recent spate of
“distracted driving” laws. See, e.g., Feds Look to Curb Texting While Driving,
COLUMBIA MISSOURIAN, Aug. 14, 2009, at 4A (arguing that Distracted Driving
Laws are a “cause célèbre”); Myron Levin, Cellphone Law May Not Make Roads
Safer, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2008, at A1.
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I. A PRIMER ON TIPPING POINT ANALYSIS
A. The Epidemiology of an Epidemic
To understand the fundamental structure of the
legislative epidemic, it is helpful to review the epidemiology
of any epidemic. The Tipping Point,9 the best selling work by
Malcolm Gladwell, provides an instructive comparison.
Gladwell writes, “[T]he best way to understand the
emergence of . . . trends . . . or any number of the other
mysterious changes that mark everyday life is to think of
them as epidemics.”10
In this regard, the medical epidemic stands as the
paradigm. Of it, Gladwell states, “[it is] a function of the
people who transmit infectious agents, the infectious agent
itself, and the environment in which the infectious agent is
operating.”11 Showcased in the book is Baltimore’s syphilis
epidemic that occurred during the 1990s. The author tracks
those who were infected and the nature of the infection, but
also examines the seemingly unrelated but simultaneous
changes of environmental behavior that may have
contributed to its spread12—in other words, what may have
caused the virus to tip.13 “Tipping” is a critical component of
an epidemic because it is the “one dramatic moment . . .
when everything can change.”14
This phenomenon is also seen in the novel 2009 H1N1
influenza epidemic.15 What began as an influenza that

9. GLADWELL, supra note 1.
10. Id. at 7. The author identifies three other elements that comprise an
epidemic: contagiousness, the big effect of little causes, and a dramatic moment.
Id. at 9.
11. Id. at 18.
12. See id. at 17-18 (identifying the following simultaneous environmental
behaviors: (1) the increase in the use of crack cocaine that led to riskier sexual
behaviors; (2) a breakdown of medical services for the poor; and (3) the
migration of the poor to other parts of town because of limited housing options).
13. Id. at 15-19.
14. Id. at 9.
15. Initially referred to as the “swine flu” because it was similar to the virus
that originated in pigs, this pandemic began in Mexico and spread throughout
the world in a relatively short time. See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention,
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infected people in Mexican rural communities in spring
2009, quickly tipped, with the virus spreading throughout
the world so rapidly that it was officially recognized as a
pandemic by June 2009 by the World Health Organization.16
This declaration reflected that the new H1N1 virus had
spread to more than seventy countries, with 28,774
confirmed cases and 144 deaths worldwide.17
The attributes of this pandemic are clear. First is the
nature of this particular agent: it spreads easily from
person to person so that its contagion factor makes it
susceptible to dramatic spread.18 Second is the likelihood
that people with undiagnosed cases who are contagious
might be among unsuspecting populations.19 The final
attribute is the ease and accessibility of world travel which
accounted for the rapid spread worldwide.20 With knowledge
about the virus still unfolding at the writing of this Article,
the H1N1 virus may be more deadly than first assumed.21

H1N1 Flu (Swine Flu) and You, http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/general_info.htm
(last visited Dec. 6, 2009) [hereinafter CDC] (describing generally the virus).
16. See Caleb Hellerman, Swine Flu ‘Not Stoppable,’ World Health
Organization says, CNN, June 10, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/HEA
LTH/06/11/swine.flu.who (reporting that the World Health Organization
officially declared the novel H1N1 influenza a global pandemic in June 2009).
17. Id. (stating that as of summer 2009 there had been 13,217 confirmed
cases and 27 deaths in the United States).
18. See CDC, supra note 15 (describing how the virus is transmitted).
19. See id. (urging people to stay home if there is a belief they may be
infected).
20. Proof that travel increases the likelihood of an epidemic includes multiple
community outbreaks and the fact that over seventy countries had registered
H1N1 cases by June. See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Novel H1N1
Flu:
Background
on
the
Situation, http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/back
ground.htm (last visited Dec. 6, 2009) (providing a daily diary of the progress of
the outbreaks throughout the world).
21. See Swine Flu: H1N1 Virus More Dangerous than Suspected, Except to
Survivors of the 1918 Pandemic Flu Virus, SCIENCE DAILY, July 14, 2009,
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2009/07/090713212231.htm (arguing that
there may be a misunderstanding about the deadliness of this virus); see also
Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009 H1N1 Flu: Situation Update,
http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/update.htm (last visited Dec. 6, 2009) (reporting
that as of fall 2009, twenty-fives states reported “widespread” outbreaks of the
H1N1 virus with increases in resulting deaths and doctors’ visits).
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Modernly, the most devastating spread of a disease has
been the HIV/AIDS pandemic, which has “claimed the lives
of over 25 million people worldwide and infected 40 million
more. In the United States alone, 1.2 million are infected
with the HIV virus and more than 500,000 have died.”22 The
tipping point of this deadly epidemic came in the 1980s,23
when there was a lack of understanding on how the virus
spread and a lack of adequate medication.24
While environmental factors contributed to the HIV
epidemic,25 one other factor impacted the severity of the
epidemic: the virus itself changed.26 Gladwell writes that
one important principle of virology is that a strain that
circulates at the beginning of an outbreak is not the same
strain that circulates at the end of an epidemic.27 In his
classic work Viral Sex: The Nature of AIDS,28 Jaap
Goudsmit observed, “It started as a virus causing disease in
low frequency after a long period of infection. It emerged as
a high-frequency and very speedy killer.”29
The principle of mutation is an important theme in this
Article. Like medical epidemics whose virology may
transform over the course of the spread, legislative
epidemics are susceptible to similar change, where
22. Posting of Lauren Finley to The Aids Pandemic, http://the-aidspandemic.blogspot.com/2007/02/history-of-hivaids-in-united-states.html (Feb. 2,
2007) (writing that the apex of the epidemic was in the 1980s).
23. See AEGIS, supra note 2 (noting that known deaths from AIDS increased
from 31 to 5636 between 1980 and 1986).
24. See Finley, supra note 22 (reporting on reasons for the increase in deaths
in the 1980s).
25. See generally JAAP GOUDSMIT, VIRAL SEX: THE NATURE
(illuminating the nature and origin of this lethal disease).

OF

AIDS (1997)

26. Id. at 37-42 (tracking the change in the virus).
27. See GLADWELL, supra note 1, at 22.
28. GOUDSMIT, supra note 25.
29. Id. at 37. The same concern was expressed with respect to the H5N1
strain of avian flu. See Carl H. Coleman, Beyond the Call of Duty: Compelling
Health Care Professionals to Work During an Influenza Pandemic, 94 IOWA L.
REV. 1, 6-7 (2008) (warning that the flu has the capacity to change with each
transmission). Today, researchers report that the H1N1 virus has similarly
mutated into a more severe strain that attacks the lungs in young people. See
WHO Warns of Severe Form of H1N1 Virus, FOX NEWS, Aug. 29, 2009,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,544262,00.html.
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succeeding generations of laws prove to be more ferocious
than the initial legislation. As Part III highlights, some
legislative epidemics, like their medical counterparts, also
mutate over time, often into more aggressive and ferocious
legislation than their early incarnations.
B. The Social Epidemic
Gladwell’s theory, of course, extends beyond the
examination of a medical epidemic. The premise of the book
is that “[i]deas and products and messages and behaviors
spread just like viruses do.”30 Gladwell applies the same
analysis from medical epidemics to social phenomena to
ask: what makes an idea or product tip so that it moves
from obscurity to fame? Whether it is the trendiness of a
piece of clothing, the word-of-mouth that makes a
restaurant or movie “hot,” or the dramatic rise and fall of
crime, his tipping point analysis serves as a framework to
help understand dramatic change in behavior. In Gladwell’s
words, this dramatic change in behavior is the tipping point,
“the moment of critical mass, the threshold, the boiling
point.”31
In the analysis of a social phenomenon or epidemic,
three factors control its rise: (1) the core group of people
who transmit the message; (2) the enduring nature of the
message; and (3) an environment that is conducive to
spreading the message.32 There is one additional ingredient
that defines an epidemic. That is the speed at which the
change in behavior takes place. It is the dramatic change in
a short period of time that is the hallmark of an epidemic,33
or what Gladwell calls the moment “when everything can

30. GLADWELL, supra note 1, at 7.
31. Id. at 12. (providing historical context for the origin of the term “tipping
point,” which first came into use in the 1970s to describe whites leaving for the
suburbs when twenty percent or more African Americans had moved into the
neighborhood).
32. See id. at 18-19 (describing the factors that tip an epidemic).
33. Id. (defining a tipping point as a sudden change in behavior); accord
Kevin Werbach, The Centripetal Network: How the Internet Holds Itself
Together, and the Forces Tearing it Apart, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 343, 410 (2008)
(observing that tipping points are “where change suddenly accelerates and
becomes difficult to stop”).
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change all at once.”34 Professor Cass Sunstein describes the
effect as “cascades.”35 In his work on group deliberations,
Professor Sunstein writes, “Social influences can lead
groups to go quite rapidly in identifiable directions, often as
a result of ‘cascade’ effects involving either the spread of
information (whether true or false) or growing reputational
pressure.”36
But if cascades can form quickly in one direction, they
are equally sensitive to sudden shifts in the opposite
direction. The reason for the changes is possibly due to an
underlying feature of the cascade; conformity of behavior by
a large group of people may be the result of a blind
adherence to the behavior of others, rather than a choice
based on the individual’s personal knowledge.37 So, oncetrendy restaurants can quickly become empty and the
“must-have” item of clothing now sits on the bargain rack in
the department store.
For the transmission to move into a phenomenon, it also
takes a conflation of three additional attributes of change:
what Gladwell calls the “Law of the Few,” the “Stickiness
Factor,” and the “Power of Context.”38 The Law of the Few
examines the core group of people who are responsible for
creating the social or medical epidemic.39 The Stickiness
34. GLADWELL, supra note 1, at 9.
35. See Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes,
110 YALE L.J. 71, 77 (2000) (depicting the wave of social action as a cascade); see
also David Hirshleifer, The Blind Leading the Blind: Social Influence, Fads, and
Informational Cascades (UC L.A.: Anderson Graduate Sch. of Mgmt. 1993),
available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/anderson/fin/24-93. “An informational
cascade occurs when it is optimal for an individual, having observed the actions
of those ahead of him, to follow the behavior of the preceding person without
regard to his own information.” Id. at abstract.
36. Sunstein, supra note 35, at 77 (analyzing group deliberations and the
resulting polarization).
37. See, e.g., Hirshleifer, supra note 35, at 5 (recognizing the precarious
nature of cascades because they are based on so little information).
38. GLADWELL, supra note 1, at 19.
39. Id. at 30-88. Other legal academics have used the “Law of the Few” to
inform their own work. See, e.g., Eleanor Marie Lawrence Brown, Outsourcing
Immigration Compliance, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2475, 2516-17 (2009) (referring to
intermediaries who shape norms as “mavens”); Dennis A. Kaufman, The
Tipping Point on the Scales of Civil Justice, 25 TOURO L. REV. 347, 426-31 (2009)
(theorizing that Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), which held
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Factor focuses on the message itself and the qualities that
make it memorable.40 Finally, the Power of Context
carefully considers the role that environment plays in
affecting the change in behavior.41 Together, these
attributes have the potential to produce an epidemic. And it
appears not to matter whether the topic is the outbreak of a
sexually transmitted disease,42 the trendiness of a brand of
shoes43 or the “must-have” toy of the Christmas season.44 In
the end, epidemics are transmitted “through social
connections and energy and enthusiasm and personality.”45
II. DECONSTRUCTING A LEGISLATIVE EPIDEMIC
If epidemics are indeed transmitted through “social
connections and energy and enthusiasm and personality,”46
can it not also be said that legislation spreads from state to
state because of similar connections, energy, and
enthusiasm? It is neither new nor radical to suggest that
unconstitutional the criminalization of sodomy, was shaped by “the Law of the
Few”).
40. GLADWELL, supra note 1, at 89-132. The term “stickiness” was later the
subject of a very interesting book written as a follow-up to The Tipping Point.
See CHIP HEATH & DAN HEATH, MADE TO STICK: WHY SOME IDEAS SURVIVE AND
OTHERS DIE (2007) (explaining six principles that make some ideas “stick”); see
also infra notes 131-72 and accompanying text (reviewing these six principles).
41. See GLADWELL, supra note 1, at 133-92. Commentators have used the
Power of Context in their own work. See Kaufman, supra note 39, at 435
(arguing that a changed environment helped the United States Supreme Court
to craft new law in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558); Kimberly Jade Norwood,
Blackthink’s Acting White Stigma in Education And How It Fosters Academic
Paralysis in Black Youth, 50 HOW. L.J. 711, 734 & n.95 (2007) (contending that,
under the Power of Context, children are shaped by the physicality of their
environment).
42. See GLADWELL, supra note 1, at 19.
43. Id. at 3-5 (tracing the dramatic rise of the Hush Puppy).
44. See Olivia Barker, Meet Top Secret Elmo, USA TODAY, Feb. 2, 2006, at 6D
(describing the pandemonium in 1996 when demand far exceeded the supply of
the Tickle Me Elmo, the “must-have” toy that Christmas season). Fast forward
to 2006 and the same sense of heightened expectation was brewing over the
release of a new Elmo. See Kelly B. Grant, Desperate for TMX Elmo?, SMART
MONEY, Oct. 20, 2006, http://www.smartmoney.com/spending/deals/desperatefor-tmx-elmo-20254) (detailing the reasons for the public’s desire for the doll).
45. GLADWELL, supra note 1, at 22.
46. Id.
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law is not an autonomous, hermetically-sealed system.
Social theories of law are based on the recognition that law
is informed by causes outside the legal system. Theorists
recognize that a relationship exists between the legal and
social, which is “a kind of network or meshwork through
which energy easily flows.”47 If that is true, then an analysis
of social forces best explains “what shapes and molds [the
law], what makes it ebb and flow, contract and expand.”48 In
this section, I explore the combination of social forces that
coalesce around a legal issue: a small core group of people
poised to spread the message (the Law of the Few), the
enduring nature of the message (the “Stickiness” Factor),
and an environment conducive to allow the legislation to
spread (The Power of Context).
A. The Law of the Few: Forces Behind the Legislation
Interestingly, in both social and legal epidemics, it is
not the number of people, but the nature and makeup of the
people involved, that insure whether an idea takes hold and
spreads.49 In its initial phase, an epidemic does not rely on
hoards of people to spread the idea or product. To the
contrary, the premise of the Law of the Few is that behind
each phenomenon is a small group of people who, because of
force of personality, connections to others, and knowledge of
the issue at hand, have the power to captivate larger
numbers of people to change.50
What we are speaking about is influence. While one
might initially think of government officials or wealthy
people as those who control a cascading social phenomenon,
47. Lawrence M. Friedman, Law, Lawyers, and Popular Culture, 98 YALE L.J.
1579, 1580 (1989); see also Russell D. Covey, Criminal Madness: Cultural
Iconography and Insanity, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1375, 1376 (2009) (contending that
changes in law and popular culture are informed by each other).
48. Friedman, supra note 47, at 1581.
49. For a corroborating take on this phenomenon, see ED KELLER & JON
BERRY, THE INFLUENTIALS: ONE AMERICAN IN TEN TELLS THE OTHER NINE HOW TO
VOTE, WHERE TO EAT AND WHAT TO BUY 29 (2003), who claim that Influentials,
because of their strategic placement at the center of the conversation, can
accelerate trends.
50. GLADWELL, supra note 1, at 33 (noting that social epidemics are heavily
dependent on these people); see id. at 19 (referencing the 80/20 Principle, where
“roughly 80% of the work will be done by 20% of the participants”).
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it requires more than a “top down” initiative to have
mainstream success.51 Indeed, the Law of the Few
contemplates more than this stereotype. Gladwell observes
that several personality types make up the Law of the Few
and each is critical to the onset and evolution of an
epidemic. This core group of people generally include:
Connectors, those who know a broad array of people from all
walks of life, and who are, therefore, able to spread the
word more easily;52 Mavens, who are extremely
knowledgeable about a range of topics and are therefore
trustworthy in their recommendations;53 and Persuaders,
who, with eloquence, enthusiastic presence, and likeability,
are able to persuade others of their viewpoints.54 And, the
Law of the Few controls whether one examines the outbreak
of a sexually transmitted disease,55 the trendiness of a
particular shoe,56 the “must-have” toy of the Christmas
season,57 or sweeping criminal reform.58
51. See KELLER & BERRY, supra note 49, at 31-32 (describing the
demographics of influential trendsetters).
52. GLADWELL, supra note 1, at 30-59. Legal scholars have also recognized the
value of Connectors. See, e.g., Kyle Graham, Why Torts Die, 35 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 359, 387 (2008) (employing the term ‘Connector’ to define those people who
are better able to gather opposition to a stated position); Mary Kreiner Ramirez,
Into the Twilight Zone: Informing Judicial Discretion in Federal Sentencing, 57
DRAKE L. REV. 591, 638-39 (2009) (acknowledging the role that Connectors play
in the spread of ideas).
53. GLADWELL, supra note 1, at 59-69 (acknowledging that the term “maven”
is derived from Yiddish and means “one who accumulates knowledge”). One of
the best known Mavens of recent era is Oprah Winfrey, whose social
recommendations—from books to clothing to diet tips—cause those items to
skyrocket in popularity. Oprah has been named by Time as one of the 100 most
influential people of the year for six straight years. See Oprah Winfrey’s
Biography, http://www.oprah.com/article/pressroom/oprahsbio/20080602_orig_o
prahsbio/10 (last visited Dec. 6, 2009) (describing Oprah Winfrey’s honorary
achievements).
54. See GLADWELL, supra note 1, at 69-74.
55. Id. at 19-20 (referencing the small core of infected people who spread
gonorrhea in Colorado Springs).
56. Id. at 67-68 (theorizing about those responsible for the dramatic rise in
the sales of Hush Puppies).
57. See Grant, supra note 44 (reporting that only fifty people had seen the
new version of the doll and the well-placed quotes of merchandizing experts
were designed to generate the buzz about the toy); see also Barker, supra note
44 (publishing the reviewers’ statement).
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In a powerful example, Gladwell writes of Paul Revere’s
famous nighttime ride to spread the word that the British
were coming. But, as Gladwell notes, there were two riders
that evening—Paul Revere and William Dawes. Each was
charged with getting the word out to a particular territory
and group of people. Yet, William Dawes was not able to
command the same attention or followers as Paul Revere.59
Why, with the same message of urgency, was William
Dawes a spectacular failure at his assignment, while Paul
Revere was famously successful?
The reason, Gladwell surmises, lies as much in the
power of the person conveying the message as it does in the
message itself. Dawes did not have Revere’s force of
personality or connections with the people he approached.60
Indeed, in the retelling of that fateful night, no one could
even remember William Dawes.61 Paul Revere, by contrast,
was outgoing and well-known beyond his immediate circle—
in other words, he was a true Connector.62 And as Gladwell
notes, “[w]ord-of-mouth epidemics are the work of
Connectors. William Dawes was just an ordinary man.”63
So, too, at the heart of legislative epidemics are small
groups of people who effectively disseminate the message.
Although one might think that elected officials who sponsor
the legislation are most closely associated with its spread,
interestingly, that is often not the case.64 Sometimes, as this
58. See infra notes 65-110 and accompanying text (describing those
intimately connected with the passage of stricter drunk driving laws, three
strikes laws, and sex offender registration schemes).
59. See GLADWELL, supra note 1, at 31-33.
60. Id. at 30-34, 56-59 (distinguishing between Paul Revere and William
Dawes).
61. Id. at 58 (citing DAVID HACKETT FISCHER, PAUL REVERE’S RIDE passim
(1994) (describing what transpired that evening)).
62. Id. at 56-58. There are Paul Reveres among us. See, e.g., KELLER & BERRY,
supra note 49, at 27-28 (showcasing Isabel Milano as a leader in her community
to whom people turned).
63. GLADWELL, supra note 1, at 59.
64. In an interesting note of political trivia, Assembly Bill 971, a version of
the Three Strikes Law, was originally introduced by Bill Jones and Jim Costa,
two California state legislators. See JENNIFER E. WALSH, THREE STRIKES LAWS 38
(2007) (tracing the evolution of Three Strikes Law). However, Bill Jones and Jim
Costa were not associated with the legislation that ultimately passed. Rather, as
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section demonstrates, the catalyst for legislative change
turns out to be “average citizens” propelled into the
limelight by tragic circumstances. In the case of proposals
for stricter drunk driving laws, longer prison sentences, and
comprehensive treatment of sex offenders, each proposal
was advanced because of the death of loved ones.
1. Candy Lightner, MADD, and Drunk Driving. A
generation later, it is difficult to imagine that the drunk
was a celebrated American image. Yet, back in the 1960s,
the three-martini lunch,65 entertainers who relied on their
visibly inebriated personas,66 and holiday parties where
guests routinely drove home drunk were all part of the
cultural norm. Thankfully, these once-revered images have
given way to others: designated drivers, stricter drunk
driving laws, and deeper examination of the problems
associated with drinking.
Although a number of factors led to this paradigm shift,
this section focuses on one: the contribution of Ms. Candy
Lightner, whose thirteen-year-old daughter, Cari, was killed
by a drunk driver in 1980.67 Appalled to learn that the
driver, who had prior drunk driving convictions, would
probably receive little or no jail time,68 Ms. Lightner decided
to found an organization devoted to strengthening laws
against drunk driving.69 Hence Mothers Against Drunk
seen later in this Article, non-politicians became closely identified with its
passage. See infra notes 77-96.
65. See Mike Drummond, What Ever Happened to the 3 Martini Lunch?,
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Mar. 14, 2005, at 3D.
66. Dean Martin, a crooner during the 50s and 60s, centered his lounge act on
jokes on being drunk. See Dean Martin Biography, http://www.ratpack.biz/deanmartin/biography.htm (last visited Dec. 6, 2009) (describing Dean Martin with
highball always in hand). Foster Brooks, a comedian from that era, also gained
notoriety with his drunk routines. See Doug Sanders, Tombstone Tributes:
Foster Brooks, http://www.wildestwesterns.com/no_4/tributes/foster_brooks.htm
(last visited Dec. 6, 2009) (discussing his famed comedy sketches).
67. See Mothers Against Drunk Driving, History, http://www.madd.org/Abo
ut-us/About-us/History.aspx (last visited Dec. 6, 2009) (recounting the
beginnings of the organization).
68. Mothers
Against
Drunk
Driving,
Cari
Lightner’s
Story,
http://www.madd.org/getattachment/ce0aa0e2-82d7-4a79-8a2d-3d20a2ab6a42/
Cari-Lightner-s-and-Laura-Lamb-s-Story.aspx (last visited Dec. 6, 2009).
69. Id.
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Driving, MADD for short, was born.70 With little money or
clout at inception, the organization ultimately challenged
politicians to act and a public to rethink its favorable image
of the drunk.
So ingrained was the public’s tolerance of the drunk
driver that, in California, for example, charges for drunk
driving deaths were universally treated as vehicular
manslaughter.71 It was not until 1981 in People v. Watson
that the California Supreme Court allowed an indictment to
proceed for second degree murder in the deaths of two
people arising from a drunk driving accident.72 Indeed, the
policy to charge drunk driving deaths as manslaughter was
so entrenched in California law that every lower court in
Watson had dismissed the murder indictment.73
However, by 1981, when the California Supreme Court
considered Watson, there was an environmental shift in
attitude concerning drunk driving, a shift for which Candy
Lightner was partly responsible. Ironically, one would not
have cast her in the role of activist. Before the tragic death
of her daughter, Candy Lightner was a divorced mother of
three selling real estate in California, not even registered to
vote.74 But the Law of the Few rewards what Gladwell calls
“Senders,” those Persuaders who effectively communicate
“emotion contagion.”75 Candy Lightner was that kind of
Persuader. By 1984, MADD had successfully lobbied
Congress to raise the national legal drinking age to twenty-

70. Id.
71. See People v. Watson, 637 P.2d 279, 290 (Cal. 1981) (Bird, J., dissenting)
(“The fact that the Legislature adopted a vehicular manslaughter statute
indicates that the Legislature intended that statute to cover these situations.”
(citation omitted)).
72. Id. at 286 (majority opinion) (concluding that a charge of vehicular
manslaughter does not preclude a charge of second degree murder on the same
facts).
73. Id. at 281-82.
74. See Biography of Candy Lightner, http://www.answers.com/topic/candylightner (last visited Dec. 6, 2009).
75. GLADWELL, supra note 1, at 85 (portraying these type of persuaders as
highly expressive).
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one and numerous states had enacted stricter laws on
drunk driving.76
2. Mike Reynolds, Mark Klaas, and Three Strikes.
Consider the passage of the 1993 “Three Strikes” law in
California,77 which had similar beginnings to MADD. In the
case of the Three Strikes law, it was the brutal murder of
eighteen-year-old Kimber Reynolds in Fresno, California in
1992, and the kidnapping and murder of twelve-year-old
Polly Klaas in Petaluma, California, in 1993. Both murders
were senseless and tragic, but in that timeframe, there were
many senseless and tragic killings. In 1992, for example,
3921 murders were reported in California, and in 1993 that
figure increased to 4096.78
So what made these two deaths stand out? In no small
measure, it was because of their fathers’ responses. The
Law of the Few was at work again. In the case of Kimber
Reynolds, who was shot and killed during a robbery of her
purse,79 her father, Mike Reynolds, vowed to push for
lengthier prison sentences80 after his daughter’s killer
received only nine years as part of a plea agreement.81 A
76. See 23 U.S.C. § 158 (2006); see also Mothers Against Drunk Drivers,
MADD
Milestones,
http://www.madd.org/getattachment/4067cd97-6b8c40b8-a767-dc26ba74036d/MADD-Milestones.aspx
(reporting
MADD’s
accomplishments).
77. Named for the law that dramatically lengthens prison sentences upon
conviction of a third felony, the Three Strikes Law was upheld by the United
States Supreme Court in a 5-4 vote in the companion cases of Ewing v.
California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) and Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003). The
law was later scaled back by The Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act of
2000. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210.1 (West Supp. 2009) (providing treatment,
rather than prison, to nonviolent drug re-offenders).
78. See The Disaster Ctr., California Crime Rates 1960-2008,
http://www.disastercenter.com/crime/cacrime.htm (last visited Dec. 6, 2009)
(reporting crime statistics for the years 1960-2008).
79. See Michael Baker, ‘Three Strikes’ Convict Charged with Theft, FRESNO
BEE, Dec. 13, 2003, at B1 (detailing the events surrounding the murder of
Kimber Reynolds).
80. See Three Strikes and You’re Out: Stop Repeat Offenders,
http://www.threestrikes.org/index.html (last visited Dec. 6, 2009) (discussing the
motivation of Mike Reynolds). The slogan “Three Strikes and You’re Out” was
coined to summarize in a sticky, yet simple way, this complex set of laws. See
infra notes 111-72 (describing the Stickiness Factor).
81. See Baker, supra note 79 (reporting the plea agreement that the shooter
received).
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wedding photographer by profession, but fueled by the
injustice of the light sentence his daughter’s killer received,
Mike Reynolds pressed on to put a proposition on the
California ballot to increase prison sentences.82
Under the Law of the Few, Mike Reynolds was a
Connector who had opportunities to work with the
legislature. However, a person with an important message
and an audience is not enough. William Dawes reminds us
of this lesson. Although Mike Reynolds had a compelling
story and the legislature’s attention initially, his campaign
faltered both at the legislative level83 and at the grass roots
level.84 Attempts to secure the requisite number of
signatures to put his proposition on the upcoming ballot
failed.85 Under the Law of the Few, Mike Reynolds was
starting to look a lot like a very frustrated William Dawes—
he had an important message to share, but few were
initially listening.86
What Mike Reynolds needed was a Persuader and a
stickier message. Enter Marc Klaas. The story of the
kidnapping and murder of his twelve-year-old daughter
Polly at the hands of Richard Allen Davis is as
unforgettable as it is heartbreaking. Polly was kidnapped at
night by Davis from her home in Petaluma during a
sleepover while her mother and sisters slept in another
room. Her body was found two months later in a shallow
grave about thirty miles from home. She had been
82. See WALSH, supra note 64, at 38 (describing the early efforts of Mike
Reynolds).
83. For an excellent recitation of behind-the-scenes politics of Reynolds’s
failed initial attempts to pass Three Strikes legislation, see Michael Vitiello,
Three Strikes: Can We Return to Rationality?, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 395,
409-18 (1997).
84. See WALSH, supra note 64, at 38 (portraying the initial efforts to pass
Three Strikes Law as “destined for failure”).
85. Id. (reporting that initial attempts to gather signatures fell far short of
the 400,000 required).
86. See Vitiello, supra note 83, at 411 (reporting that, despite the
impassioned pleas of Mike Reynolds, the State Legislative Committee soundly
rejected the proposed legislation). Even Mike Reynolds recognized that he had
not gained the attention of the legislature. See id. at 411 n.87 (“They figured
they’d listen to me, pat me on the head, say I’m sorry about your daughter, and
send me home.”).
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strangled.87 Richard Allen Davis was a habitual offender
with a lengthy prison rap sheet that dated back to the 1960s
and included convictions or plea agreements for burglaries,
robbery, kidnapping, and sexual assault.88
It is fair to say that the murder of Polly captured the
nation’s attention in a way that the killing of Kimber
Reynolds did not. Dubbed “America’s child,”89 Polly’s
kidnapping and murder struck a universal chord.90 A
congresswoman during session summed up the national
mood when she said, “It is clear that this real life nightmare
has sent shock waves through America.”91
Public outrage only grew as Davis’s extensive prison
record came to light. And extensive it was: among the
crimes were two prior kidnappings and, additionally, he had
only served half of the sixteen-year sentence on the last
kidnapping.92 The public asked, “How could a person with
this criminal record have been released from prison?” It was
the same question Mike Reynolds had been demanding to
know for some time, but until Polly’s death, that question
had not yet resonated with the public.
87. See Polly Klaas Found., Polly’s Abduction, http://www.pollyklaas
.org/about/pollys-story.html (last visited Dec. 6, 2009) (providing a complete
description of events the evening that Polly was kidnapped from her home).
88. See Biographicon.com, Richard Allen Davis, http://www.biograph
icon.com/view/kh54e (last visited Dec. 6 2009) (reporting Davis’s extensive
encounters with law enforcement, including arrests and convictions).
89. See Elizabeth Gleick & Tom Cunneff, America’s Child, PEOPLE MAG., Dec.
20, 1993, at 84 (airing the details of Polly’s death and the background of her
assailant). The moniker “America’s child” was also used as the title of a book.
See BARRY BORTNICK, POLLY KLAAS: THE MURDER OF AMERICA’S CHILD (1995).
90. Polly’s kidnapping and murder was the subject of numerous media
reports. See C-SPAN, Congressional Chronicle (Nov. 21, 1993), http://www.cspanarchives.org/congress/?q=node/77531&id=7880451 (quoting Representative
Woolsey’s representation of the number of national news stories that had
appeared on the crime); Notorious Episode Guide on Biography.com, Free to
Kill: The Polly Klaas Murder, http://www.biography.com/notorious/episodeguid
e.do?episodeid=167075 (last visited Dec. 6, 2009).
91. C-SPAN, supra note 90 (transcribing Representative Woolsey’s
statement). For a discussion of the public’s strong reaction to the kidnapping
and murder of Polly Klaas, see Vitiello, supra note 83, at 410, who writes, “[The]
Three Strikes Law passed without serious rational discourse or legislative
compromise because of public panic.”
92. See Biographicon.com, supra note 88.
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Ultimately it was Polly’s father, Marc Klaas, who
emerged as the central and recognizable face for the fight
for longer prison sentences.93 As one writer noted, Marc
Klaas—the Everyman—was the favorite of the news media.
“He was photogenic, handsome, articulate, and cameraready.”94 There was a marked shift in the political
atmosphere as legislators now scurried to support Three
Strikes legislation.95 Both Connector and Persuader, his
joining forces with Mike Reynolds to push for the passage of
California’s Three Strikes Law made the difference.96 Marc
Klaas was Paul Revere.
3. Jacob, Megan, Adam, and Sex Offender Registration.
In the case of sex offender registration laws, their rise to
national prominence followed a similar trajectory. The story
also begins with heartbreaking loss, with three families who
suffered undeniable tragedy—the murder of their children.
Six-year-old Adam Walsh was abducted and murdered in
1981,97 eleven-year-old Jacob Wetterling was abducted at
93. Following his daughter’s death, Marc Klaas became a child rights
advocate, first with the Polly Klaas Foundation and later with KlaasKids which
seeks to work for “stronger sentencing for violent criminals.” See KlaasKids
Foundation for Children, Our Story, http://www.klaaskids.org/pg-ourstory.htm
(last visited Dec. 6, 2009).
94. Greg
Cahill,
The
Longest
Year,
http://www.metroactive.com/
sonoma/klaas95.html (last visited Dec. 6, 2009) (showcasing Marc Klaas’s efforts
in the aftermath of Polly’s murder).
95. See WALSH, supra note 64, at 39-40 (describing a press conference shortly
after Davis’s arrest where then Attorney General Dan Lungren appeared with
Mike Reynolds to endorse the effort to reform the sentencing guidelines).
96. Entitled Proposition 184, voters overwhelmingly approved the law by
seventy-two percent in 1994. See Dan Morain & Virginia Ellis, Tobacco Industry
Power May Go Up in Smoke, Foes Say, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1994, at A3
(comparing the successful Three Strikes Proposition to the failed Proposition
188, which would have repealed the indoor smoking ban in California). The new
law was later codified in CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667, 1170.12 (West 2008). By
many accounts, it was a short-lived union as the Klaas family later appeared to
be uncomfortable with the breadth of some provisions in the law. See infra note
256 and accompanying text.
97. See National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, The Adam
Walsh Story, http://www.missingkids.com/missingkids/servlet/PageServlet?Pa
geId=1156 (last visited Dec. 6, 2009) (offering the account of Adam’s abduction
in 1981); see also Rich Phillips, Police: Drifter Killed Adam Walsh in 1981, CNN,
Dec. 16, 2008, http://edition.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/12/16/walsh.case.closed
(reporting in 2008 that police have finally closed the case on Adam Walsh’s
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gunpoint and presumed murdered in 1989,98 and sevenyear-old Megan Kanka was sexually assaulted and
murdered in 1994 by a neighbor who, unbeknownst to
Megan’s family, had prior convictions for sexual assault
against children.99
None of these families knew each other. The killings of
these three children took place several years apart, in
different states, and by different killers. But nonetheless,
the Law of the Few was in effect. Fueled by impassioned
efforts on behalf of their children, these parents galvanized
the nation. And as a result of their separate and individual
efforts, the issue “tipped,” creating an epidemic of legislative
actions around the country designed to protect children and
communities from registered sex offenders.100
As a result, Congress passed the Jacob Wetterling
Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender
Registration Act, which was included in the Federal 1994
Omnibus Crime Bill.101 The law required the states to adopt
sex offender registration laws within three years of the Act’s
passage in order to receive federal law enforcement
funding.102 In what is known popularly as “Megan’s Law,”
abduction and murder, believing that a drifter, now deceased, was Adam
Walsh’s killer).
98. See
generally
Jacob
Wetterling
Res.
Ctr.,
History,
http://www.jwrc.org/Default.aspx?tabid=128 (last visited Dec. 6, 2009)
(describing the abduction of Jacob Wetterling as well as the history and
programs of the Jacob Wetterling Foundation).
99. See State v. Timmendequas, 737 A.2d 55, 68-69 (N.J. 1999) (recounting
the tragic killing of Megan Kanka).
100. For scholarship that tracks the various legislative actions, see, for
example, Catherine L. Carpenter’s, The Constitutionality of Strict Liability in
Sex Offender Registration Laws, 86 B.U. L. REV. 295, 324-38 (2006), which
reviews categories of sex offender registration laws in the country; and Asmara
Teckle-Johnson, In the Zone: Sex Offenders and the Ten Percent Solution, 94
IOWA L. REV. 607, 617-20 (2009), for a detailed description of state and local
laws.
101. See 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2006) (establishing federal guidelines for state sex
offender registration laws).
102. See id. § 14071(g). States that did not comply were faced with decreased
funding. See id. § 14071(g)(2). Although congressional action provided the final
impetus for these laws, a few states had passed sex offender registration laws
much earlier. See Abril R. Bedarf, Examining Sex Offender Community
Notification Laws, 83 CAL. L. REV. 885, 887 n.4 (1995) (noting that Alabama,
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Congress amended the Jacob Wetterling Act in 1996 to
include community notification statutes.103 In 2006
Congress passed the Adam Walsh Child Protection and
Safety Act, a comprehensive set of regulations, penalties,
and punishments for sex offenders.104
But what made this issue of sex offender registration
tip, and why in 1994? Molestation and abuse of children
certainly were not new occurrences in 1994 when the
Federal Omnibus Crime Bill was passed. Department of
Justice statistics highlight that abuse and molestation of
children under the age of eighteen were well-documented,
serious problems at that time.105
As with the genesis of stricter drunk driving laws and
the Three Strikes Law, the Law of the Few played an
important role in the origins of sex offender registration
schemes. Highlighting the need for these laws began with
the families of these victims. These parents shared similar
backgrounds to Candy Lightner, Mike Reynolds, and Marc
Klaas in that, before these tragic events, none were
professional advocates for criminal reform. John Walsh,
charismatic and articulate, and known to Americans as the
host of the long-running television show, America’s Most
Wanted, is the first to admit that being an advocate for
Arizona, California, Illinois, and Nevada were the first to introduce sex offender
registration laws).
103. See 42 U.S.C. § 14071(e)(2) (mandating that the designated state law
enforcement agency “shall release relevant information that is necessary to
protect the public concerning a specific person required to register under this
section”). Indeed, so strong was the public’s reaction to the Kanka’s call for
reform, that within three months of the petition’s creation, New Jersey passed
the first Megan’s Law. See E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1081-82 (3d Cir.
1997) (describing the frantic pace at which the New Jersey legislature passed
Megan’s Law).
104. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901-16991 (2006). The Act has been the subject of
considerable controversy, with some courts dismissing indictments under it. See
Emily A. White, Note, Prosecutions Under the Adam Walsh Act: Is America
Keeping Its Promise?, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1783, 1792 nn.64-66 (2008)
(collecting cases); see also infra Part III (discussing the inherent problems of
legislative epidemics).
105. For the executive summary of the report, see LAWRENCE A. GREENFIELD,
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CHILD VICTIMIZERS: VIOLENT OFFENDERS AND THEIR VICTIMS
(1996), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cvvoatvx.pdf, who highlights the
statistics compiled of crimes against children.
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missing children was not what he envisioned for his life.106
Patty and Jerry Wetterling “decided to turn their anger,
sadness and fear into a groundswell of action to protect
other children.”107 Megan’s parents, Richard and Maureen
Kanka, were resolute in their belief that the public should
be made aware of sex offenders who live within their
community.108 But the deaths of their children spurred these
parents to act. Indeed, it is fair to say that not everyone is
equipped to do this. It takes a certain skill set and strength
of personality to persevere in the throes of grief and
victimization.109 That is also the lesson of the Law of the
Few.110
B. The Stickiness Factor: How Enduring is the Message?
Some slogans or phrases are so “sticky” that they
permeate the American psyche to become part of our

106. See America’s Most Wanted, About John Walsh, http://www.amw.c
om/about_amw/john_walsh.cfm (last visited Dec. 6, 2009) (“[John Walsh] was a
successful businessman, building high-end luxury hotels and building his life.
But after Adam’s murder, everything changed.”).
107. See Jacob Wetterling Res. Ctr., supra note 98 (explaining the history of
the Jacob Wetterling Foundation).
108. See Susan K. Livio & Maryann Spoto, Report: Megan’s Law Fails to Deter
Sex Offenders, STAR LEDGER (N.J.), Feb. 6, 2009, at 1 (quoting Maureen Kanka’s
position regarding Megan’s Law after researchers found the law failed to deter
sex crimes). The New Jersey Legislature passed the first iteration of Megan’s
Law in 1994. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1 (West 2005).
109. Persuaders of equal force have contributed to passage of other laws. See,
e.g., 154 CONG. REC. S9350-55 (2008) (attributing the passage of the Emmett Till
Unsolved Civil Rights Crime Act of 2007 to private citizen Alvin Sykes who
“truly made a difference”); Bureau of Justice Assistance, Background
Information on the Act and its Amendments, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/
BJA/what/2a2jwactbackground.html (last visited Dec. 6, 2009). Pam Lychner,
who survived a vicious attack, promoted an amendment to the Jacob Wetterling
Act that would provide law enforcement with greater tracking capability. The
bill was later named the Pam Lychner Act after Ms. Lychner who was killed in
the explosion of TWA flight 800. Bureau of Justice Assistance, supra.
110. Not everyone who is the victim of crime is comfortable in the spotlight.
Polly Klaas’s mother, Eve Nichol, for example, so shaken by the tragedy of her
daughter’s death, speaks out rarely. See Alex Tresniowski, Polly, Alive in
Memory, PEOPLE MAG., Sept. 22, 2003, at 187 (describing Eve’s silence in the
wake of Polly’s death).
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lexicon.111 Those who remember the 1980s Wendy’s
commercial, where a grandmotherly actress with a gravelly
voice looks at a massive bun without much hamburger, and
yells, “Where’s the beef?” will also remember everyone
asking that pointed question—from informal talk to the
presidential primary.112 But sticky messages are found in
more than advertising slogans. Casual conversations are
also peppered with phrases from movie and television.
Ads with sticky messages are understandable; they are
designed to sell products. But, what of legislation that is
designed to be sticky? One of the more interesting changes
in legislative action over the last two decades has been an
emphasis on the marketing of proposed bills. Until the
1990s, criminal laws or procedures rarely had monikers,
and if they did, they were generally named for the case that
created the rule,113 the politician that sponsored the bill,114

111. In an interesting exercise, I polled family, friends, and students to see
which phrases or slogans “stuck” with them. Interestingly, although the group
ranged in age from nineteen to over sixty years of age, the same phrases were
mentioned by nearly everyone. In these highly unscientific results, some of the
more popular sticky messages were: “Whatever” [Clueless]; Just Do It! [Nike];
“Diamonds are Forever” [KayeWest Jewelers]; “Beam Me Up, Scotty” [Star
Trek]; “Where’s the Beef” [Wendy’s]; “I’ll Be Back” [Terminator]; “Whazzzup”
[Budweiser]; “Make My Day” [Dirty Harry]; “Houston, we’ve got a problem”
[Apollo 13]; and “Show me the money!” [Jerry Maguire].
112. See Obituary, Clara Peller, the Actress in ‘Where’s the Beef?’ TV Ad, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 12, 1987, at D22 (reporting that the “Where’s the beef?” campaign
increased annual revenue by thirty-one percent, made the actress Clara Peller a
star, and even was used in the 1984 presidential primary by Walter F. Mondale
in criticism of his rival, Gary Hart).
113. The “Miranda warnings” provides a prime example of a procedure named
for the case that produced it. This popular reference to the warnings that police
must give a suspect in a custodial interrogation originated from the United
States Supreme Court decision of the same name. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966).
114. The Mann Act of 1910, which prohibited the transportation of women
across state lines for prostitution, was named after Congressman James Robert
Mann. See Biography of James Robert Mann, http://law.jrank.org
/pages/8422/Mann-James-Robert.html (last visited Dec. 6, 2009). The Unruh
Civil Rights Act, which prohibits discrimination in employment and housing,
was named for famed California Legislator Jesse M. Unruh. See BILL BOYARSKY,
BIG DADDY JESSE UNRUH AND THE ART OF POWER POLITICS 84-89 (2008) (detailing
the evolution and passage of the Act).
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or the last name of the victim.115 Legislation was rarely
personalized, and it was never known by only the first name
of the victim.
1. Personalized Legislation: Power of a Child’s Name.
With the advent of the 1990s, an indelible change occurred.
Criminal legislation became personal.116 Sex offender
registration laws and community notification statutes, for
example, heralded in a new stickiness: the use of a victim’s
first name to convey the implicit and urgent need to pass
the laws. Through their tragic and untimely deaths, the
names “Jacob Wetterling” and “Megan Kanka” became
synonymous for the Acts passed in their memory.117
What may have begun as a poignant attempt to
memorialize the tragic death of two children has, in the
ensuing fifteen years, became the common way to market
new criminal legislation. Since the passage of “Megan’s
Law,” there has been a marked rise in the use of a child’s
name associated with enacted legislation. The most
comprehensive is the Adam Walsh Act, a federal
registration and notification scheme that passed in 2006.118
And one of the most recognizable and sticky pieces of
personalized legislation is the “Amber Alert,” a child
abduction alert bulletin, in memory of nine-year-old Amber
Hagerman, who was murdered after being abducted while
riding her bicycle.119
115. The Lindbergh Law, titled the Federal Kidnapping Act, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1201-1202 (2006), grew out of the kidnapping of Charles Lindbergh Jr., the
toddler of famous aviator Charles Lindbergh. See Short History of FBI,
http://www.fbi.gov/libref/factsfigure/shorthistory.htm (last visited Dec. 6, 2009)
(recounting how the Lindberg baby’s kidnapping and murder served as a
catalyst for the federal kidnapping law).
116. Outside the criminal law, one of the more interesting personalized pieces
of legislation is the Ryan White HIV/AIDS Program, which includes
compassionate and supportive services and funds named for the eighteen-yearold who died of AIDS in 1990. See Health Res. & Serv. Admin., The Ryan White
HIV/AIDS Program, http://hab.hrsa.gov/livinghistory/timeline/19861990/1986
.html (last visited Dec. 6, 2009) (explaining the passage of the Ryan White Act).
117. See supra note 97-104 and accompanying text.
118. 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901-16991 (2006).
119. Iowa
Broadcasters
Assoc.,
History
of
Amber
Alert
Plan,
http://www.iowabroadcasters.com/ambrhist.htm (last visited Dec. 6, 2009). The
idea of systematic and statewide alerts for child abductions grew out of this
heartbreaking tragedy when a listener to a radio station suggested that that the
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There have been many other enactments as well. Each
personalized title associated with the law honors the life of
a young person and memorializes a tragic and brutal event.
Among the more notable laws passed in the wake of
“Megan’s Law” is “Jessica’s Law,” which originated in
Florida in 2005120 and was named in memory of nine-yearold Jessica Lunsford, who was raped and murdered by John
Couey, a previously convicted sex offender.121 “Jessica’s Law”
imposes a mandatory minimum sentence of twenty-five
years in prison and lifetime electronic monitoring of sexual
offenders convicted of lewd and lascivious acts against a
victim under twelve years old.122 The first national sex
offender database was informally named “Dru’s Law”123 for a
college coed who was kidnapped and murdered by a levelthree convicted sex offender.124 “Zachary’s Law,” originally
passed in 1994 and updated in 2006, is Indiana’s version of
“Megan’s Law,” and was named for ten-year-old Zachary

Emergency Alert System should be used during child abduction cases. First
established as the Dallas Amber Plan, child abduction alert bulletins are now
available nationwide. See id.
120. See H.B. 1877, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2005).
121. See Anthony Bruno, Jessica Lunsford: Death of a 9-Year Old, TRUTV
CRIME LIBRARY, http://www.trutv.com/library/crime/serial_killers/predators/jes
sica_lunsford/1_index.html (last visited Dec. 6, 2009).
122. FLA. STAT. § 800.04(5)(b) (Supp. 2009). A variation of Jessica’s Law was
passed by California voters in November 2006 under Proposition 83. See Text of
Proposition 83, reprinted in CAL. ATT’Y GEN., SEX OFFENDERS, SEXUALLY VIOLENT
PREDATORS. PUNISHMENT, RESIDENCE RESTRICTIONS AND MONITORING. INITIATIVE
STATUTE 127-38 (2006), http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/vig_06/general_06/pdf/
proposition_83/entire_prop83.pdf. States have adopted variations of Jessica’s
Law. The California law is formally known as the Sexual Predator Punishment
and Control Act: Jessica’s Law (SPPCA). See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 220, 290,
311.11 (West Supp. 2009). The passage was not without controversy. See
Jennifer Warren, Judge Blocks Part of Sex Offender Law, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 9,
2006, at A32.
123. See Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 §§ 118-120, 42
U.S.C. §§ 16918-16920 (2006) (establishing a national sex offender registry and
Dru Sjodin National Sex Offender Public Website).
124. See Bootie Cosgrove-Mather, Anger, Fear, Pain After Dru Found,
CBSNEWS, Apr. 19, 2004, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/04/20/natio
nal/main612796.shtml (reporting on the death of Dru Sjodin at the hands of
Alfonso Rodriguez, Jr., a level three convicted sex offender).
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Snyder, who was molested and murdered by a neighbor.125
“Jetseta’s Bill,” signed into law in 2006 and in memory of
murdered ten-year-old Jetseta Gage, extends prison
sentences and provides for monitoring of released
offenders.126 “Ashley’s Laws,” which are statewide measures
for harsher sentences, are named for seven-year-old Ashley
Estell, who was murdered.127 “Carlie’s Law,” a bill
introduced in Congress to toughen parole rules for sex
offenders,128 was named in memory of murdered elevenyear-old Carlie Brucia, whose abduction on a street in broad
daylight was captured on security camera footage.129 Finally,
“Jenny’s Law,” a congressional bill introduced in 2009, and
named for a recent college graduate who suffered a brutal
rape, would prevent burial-related benefits and funeral
honors for convicted sex offenders who were also military
veterans.130
2. Applying Six Principles of Stickiness. What is so
interesting about personalized legislation is just how
“sticky” the message can be. In Made to Stick: Why Some
125. See Overview of Zachary’s Law, http://www.allencountysheriff.org/sexo
ffender/zachary.html (last visited Dec. 6, 2009) (providing the background of the
passage of Zachary’s Law).
126. Bush Signs Bill Named After Jetseta Gage, QUAD-CITY TIMES, July 28,
2006, available at http://www.qctimes.com/news/state-and-regional/article_
9699fb70-59b9-561b-8567-6f27046d9e7a.html.
127. See Ashley’s Laws Require Registration, Longer Prison Terms for Sex
Offenders, DALLAS NEWS, Sept. 3, 2003, http://www.dallasnews.com/s/dw
s/spe/2003/ashleyestell/090403dnwebashleylaws.6f3db545.html (detailing the
parameters of Ashley’s Laws). In an interesting development in the case, new
DNA testing cleared Michael Blair who was convicted for the murder and
sentenced to death. Stephanie Lucero, Judge Recommends Exoneration in
Ashley Estell Case, CBS11TV.COM, May 23, 2008, http://cbs11tv.com
/local/Michael.Blair.Ashley.2.731801.html.
128. H.R. 3107, 109th Cong. (2005).
129. See Cheryl Little et al., Securing Our Borders: Post 9/11 Scapegoating of
Immigrants, 82 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1161, 1189 (2005). For the
heartbreaking account of Carlie Brucia’s abduction, see David Krajicek, The
Abduction of Carlie Brucia, TRUTV CRIME LIBRARY, http://www.trutv
.com/library/crime/notorious_murders/famous/carlie_brucia/3.html (last visited
Dec. 6, 2009). In a horrible twist to this story, police failed to use the “Amber
Alert” when Carlie was reported missing by her family because police believed
Carlie may have run away. Id.
130. Jenny’s Law, H.R. 731, 111th Cong. (2009).
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Ideas Survive and Others Die,131 authors Chip Heath and
Dan Heath identify six principles for why an idea “sticks”:
(1) simplicity, which requires that an idea be stripped to its
core; (2) unexpectedness, which means that an idea should
be counterintuitive to generate interest and curiosity; (3)
concreteness, which demands that an idea be explained in
terms of human action using concrete images; (4) credibility,
which requires that the ideas or their agents carry
authority and believability; (5) emotion, wherein the idea
must tap into a human feeling; and (6) stories, which
indicates that narratives help people respond quickly and
effectively to the message.132
Using the six principles outlined above and analyzing
one of the personalized pieces of legislation—“Megan’s Law”
for example—demonstrate the intrinsically memorable
effect of using a child’s name in the title of any criminal
legislation.
Simplicity. Using a child’s first name is the essence of
the first principle. However, one should never confuse a
simple sticky message with simple content. Simple
messages convey complex ideas in what the authors call
“profound compactness.”133 Core messages have the power to
“tap existing memory terrain of [the] audience.”134 The word
“Megan” is profoundly compact because it achieves an
essential message about the law it represents: the
protection of our children through the notification of the
community of the whereabouts of sex offenders in the
neighborhood.
There is also a corollary to the principle of simplicity.
Using simple terms actually conveys complex ideas more
easily. Framing the issue in a familiar way helps the
audience relate the underlying complex concepts to other
more commonly understood ideas. However, in the case of
sex offender registration schemes, the use of familiar
schema is both its power and potential undoing. The simple
131. See HEATH & HEATH, supra note 40, at 8 (“By stick, we mean that your
ideas are understood and remembered, and have a lasting impact—they change
your audience’s opinion or behavior.”).
132. Id. at 16-17. For a discussion of these six principles in the library world,
see Jean M. Holcomb, supra note 1, at 588-91.
133. HEATH & HEATH, supra note 40, at 52.
134. Id.
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underlying message—protect the community with
notification—helps frame the complex issue of how
notification statutes are constructed.
But, as Part III explores, simple messages are also
vulnerable to sweeping generalizations. Here, the simple
message is that the community must be protected from the
violent sexual predator who lives in the neighborhood. The
generalization is clear: each sex offender, no matter the
conviction, is painted with the same broad brush as the
violent sexual predator who killed Megan. For purposes of
this section, however, one can appreciate the value of the
stickiness in “Megan’s Law,” which conjures up a host of
malevolent images regarding sex offenders.135
Unexpectedness. At play in this principle is that a
message is stickier if it surprises, either in presentation or
content, which makes the audience take notice. In the
1990s, it was highly unexpected to speak of a law in an
intimate and personal manner. The title was unexpected.
The use of Megan’s name grabbed the attention of the
public by “increas[ing] alertness and caus[ing] focus”136 to
the issue of community notification.
Unexpectedness also sometimes arises from surprising
content, which has the effect of contradicting a preconceived
idea of the audience. In Public Opinion, political journalist
Walter Lippmann described these preconceived ideas as
stereotypes,137 which he explains as “an ordered, more or
less consistent picture of the world, to which our habits, our
tastes, our capacities, our comforts and our hopes have
adjusted themselves.”138
Unexpectedness in content surfaces when the message
is counterintuitive, when it collides with the public’s
preconceived picture of stereotypic presumptions. Two
examples stand out. When a fourteen-year-old girl from
New Jersey was charged in 2009 with child pornography for
135. In a very interesting piece on the use of language and images connected
to passage of Megan’s Law, see Daniel M. Filler, Making the Case for Megan’s
Law: A Study in Legislative Rhetoric, 76 IND. L.J. 315 (2001).
136. HEATH & HEATH, supra note 40, at 16.
137. See WALTER LIPPMANN, PUBLIC OPINION 79-103 (Transaction Publishers
1991) (1922) (describing the role that stereotypes play in making sense of the
world in which we live).
138. Id. at 95.
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posting nude pictures of herself on MySpace,139 the story
was unexpected for two reasons. First, the image of a
fourteen-year-old girl does not equate with the public’s
stereotypic image of a child pornographer. Second, the
image of a fourteen-year-old girl posting nude pictures on
MySpace collides with the ordered images that the public
has of fourteen-year-old girls. This juvenile offender was
sticky because she, and the activity in which she engaged,
were so unexpected.140
Outside the context of sexual offenses, the same
principle of unexpectedness arose when AIDS legislation
was named in memory of Ryan White, a teenager who
succumbed to AIDS in 1990. During the 1980s, plagued by
fear and ignorance, the public believed that AIDS was a
“gay man’s” disease.141 Only when Ryan White, a thirteenyear-old hemophiliac, was diagnosed with the disease, did
the public begin to change its perception.142 The image of a
thirteen-year-old was counterintuitive to the preconceived
stereotype the public maintained, and consequently, his
image generated an unexpected sticky message: HIV/AIDS
impacted larger sections of the population than the public
believed.143 Legislation bearing his name144 continues to be a
sticky reminder of disease’s vast reach.
139. See New Tack in Fight Against Teen ‘Sexting’, NJ.COM, July 21, 2009,
http://www.nj.com/news/ledger/jersey/index.ssf?/base/news-14/12481786222973
70.xml&coll=1 (describing the charges against the juvenile).
140. One outspoken critic of the pornography charges against the teenager is
Maureen Kanka, mother of Megan Kanka. Megan’s Law Mom Criticizes ‘Sexting’
Charges, NPR, Mar. 26, 2009, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php
?storyId=102399198.
141. See Finley, supra note 22 (“[HIV/AIDS was] [o]riginally seen as a highly
stigmatized disease of the gay community and feared for its mystery and
lethality. . . .”).
142. See Health Res. & Serv. Admin., supra note 116 (providing the biography
of Ryan White who died of AIDS in 1990 at eighteen years of age); see also
AGAINST THE ODDS, HIV CASE STUDY: RYAN WHITE AND ACTIVISM,
http://apps.nlm.nih.gov/againsttheodds/pdfs/ss/HIV_case_study.pdf (last visited
Dec. 6, 2009) (crediting Ryan White with helping to educate the public about
HIV/AIDS).
143. See, e.g., Jack Friedman et al., AIDS: A Diary of the Plague in America,
PEOPLE MAG., Aug. 3, 1987, at 61. Of course, we now know that the spread of
HIV/AIDS affects all parts of the population. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, HIV: FACT SHEETS (2009), http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/resources/facts
heets/PDF/us.pdf (detailing demographics afflicted with HIV/AIDS).
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Concreteness. Messages must also contain concrete
images to be remembered. Without the ability to decode
expert language, an abstract principle is difficult for a
layperson to grasp and remember.145 Concrete images help
the novice bridge the gap in understanding.146 A community
notification statute, with its myriad of regulations and
distinctions, may be a subject for lawyers and academics,
but hardly concrete for the uninitiated. Yet, the image of
Megan walking up to the door of her neighbor, a registered
sex offender, to play with a nonexistent puppy is an image
that haunts. It is an image that is memorable because it
taps into human understanding of an everyday
occurrence.147
Credibility. Messages must be inherently believable for
an audience to want to change its behavior. And so, the
message must be spoken by one who the public believes is
“credentialed” to present it (an academic, a representative
from an agency or organization, and yes, a celebrity
spokesperson).148
As the discussion on the “Law of the Few”
demonstrates, credibility to deliver the first community
notification statutes did not come from the lawyers who
drafted the law or the politicians who presented the bill.
Rather, the credibility of the message came from Megan’s
parents themselves. Their tragic loss and suffering made
them credible spokespersons for the need for community
notification statutes. The unadorned statement on their
foundation’s website—“If we had been aware of his record,
my daughter would be alive today”149—provides the kind of
144. Called The Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency
(CARE) Act of 1990, it provided comprehensive support and services for those
afflicted with HIV/AIDS. See Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources
Emergency Act of 1990 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 300ff (2006).
145. HEATH & HEATH, supra note 40, at 100.
146. Id. at 113-14.
147. See Collin O’Connor Udell, Parading the Saurian Tail: Projection, Jung,
and the Law, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 731, 748 (2000) (“The role of the symbol and the
soundbite in our high-speed culture is integral to our processing of
information.”).
148. HEATH & HEATH, supra note 40, at 132-37 (relating the various kinds of
“authority” that might provide credibility to the message).
149. Megan Nicole Kanka Found., Our Mission, http://www.megannicoleka
nkafoundation.org/mission.htm (last visited Dec. 6, 2009).
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credentialed authority that resonates with the public and
their current public statements in defense of the law
bolsters its legitimacy.150
Emotion. It is intuitive that a message that is emotional
will stick better than one delivered using abstractions. To
evoke an emotional response rather than analytical thought
“increase(s) memory for an event’s gist or center.”151 It also
enables the audience to understand the message by
connecting with the universal emotion underlying its
content.152 By way of example, Chip Heath and Dan Heath
report a study conducted by the Carnegie Mellon University
on the ways to create successful fundraising. In it, the
researchers concluded that fundraising was more effective
when conducted with a personal, rather than global
message. A story about one person who needed help was
more likely to engender warm supportive emotions that
would translate into greater contributions than would a
pitch that involved large abstract statistical discussions.153
As the principle of “concreteness” reminds, the concrete
image is stickier. Evoking an emotional response about a
concrete and singular experience enables the audience to

150. See, e.g., Christopher N. Dela Cruz, Maureen Kanka Defends Megan’s
Law Despite Report Saying It Fails to Deter Pedophiles, NJ.COM, Feb. 6, 2009,
www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2009/02/despite_new_report_on-megans_l.html;
Bevin Theodore, Maureen Kanka, Whose Daughter’s Death Spawned Megan’s
Law, to Speak in Lopatcong Twp., LEHIGHVALLEYLIVE.COM, Jan. 8, 2009,
http://www.lehighvalleylive.com/phillipsburg/index.ssf/2009/01/post_7.html;
accord Press Release, Township of Nutley, Maureen Kanka Set to Talk with
Nutley Parents on March 5th (Feb. 19, 2008), http://www.nutleynj.org/R
eleaseDetails.aspx?pid=e99e779c-5137-4af8-916b75b13a573f2f; see also Press
Release, Life-Prints, LLC, Voice for Missing Children and Child Safety Advocate
Maureen Kanka of Megan’s Law Named Spokeswoman for Life-Prints Child
Safety Software (Aug. 1, 2007), http://www.prweb.com/releases/2007/8/prwe
b544154.html (announcing that Maureen Kanka had agreed to be the
spokesperson for Life-Prints Child Safety Software).
151. HEATH & HEATH, supra note 40, at 301.
152. See LIPPMANN, supra note 137, at 13 (“The only feeling that anyone can
have about an event he does not experience is the feeling aroused by his mental
image of that event.”).
153. HEATH & HEATH, supra note 40, at 165-67 (reporting that people were
more likely to contribute in response to a plea that centers on one person as a
symbol of the need).

2010]

LEGISLATIVE EPIDEMICS

31

connect more deeply.154 MADD intuitively understood the
principle of emotional concreteness when it launched its
campaign. The organization knew that statistics on drunk
driving deaths would not begin to capture the tragic
consequences of drunk driving or the need for law reform
the way photographs would. Their presentations and ad
campaigns, which included pictures and home movies of
those killed by drunk drivers, are credited with spurring the
change in the public’s attitude about drunk driving.155
The media plays a critical role in the delivery of the
message. Media reports are generally filled with vivid
details about the singular experience, and therefore, they
tend to be well-suited to the intimate storyline.156 It is not
surprising, then, that the legislative debates surrounding
the passage of “Megan’s Law” were filled with anecdotal
stories of child abductions and murders.157 Focusing on the
single and heart wrenching account of a high-profile murder
case stirs emotion and hence is stickier than a statisticpacked discussion about the rate of recidivism among
convicted sex offenders.
In addition to the deep sadness that the public felt in
hearing the story about Megan Kanka’s murder, there was
also growing anger that laws at the time were inadequate to
prevent this occurrence.158 The anger that is witnessed at
154. Id. at 165-203 (discussing the importance of using concrete images to tap
human emotion).
155. See Laurie Davies, 25 Years of Saving Lives, DRIVEN (Mothers Against
Drunk Driving, Irving, Tex.), Fall 2005, at 11, available at
http://www.madd.org/getattachment/48e81e1b-df43-4f31-b9a1d94d5b940e62/MA
DD-25-Years-of-Saving-Lives.aspx (noting Marilyn Sabin, Coordinator for the
California Office of Traffic Safety, who reported that before MADD’s
involvement, she saw several DUI bills fail in California).
156. For a review of the media’s role in skewing perception about the
commonness of crime, see David M. Zlotnick, The War Within the War on Crime:
The Congressional Assault on Judicial Sentencing Discretion, 57 SMU L. REV.
211, 243-44 (2004).
157. See Filler, supra note 135, at 329-30 (referencing statements made by
legislators).
158. See, e.g., Lisa Anderson, Demand Grows to ID Molesters, States Weigh
Children’s Safety Versus Offenders’ Rights, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 15, 1994, at 1
(noting that community anger was “the catalyst” for passage of community
notification laws); Stephen W. Dill, A Plea for the Sake of Megan, PHILA. DAILY
NEWS, Aug. 3, 1994, at 4 (describing the grief and anger of communities over the
death of Megan Kanka and of rallies that urge the passage of new laws to
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the time of the killing of Megan Kanka fuels two general
responses: it translates into making the story stickier and it
spurs people to promote legislation designed to address the
anger.159 With legislation in place, anger is replaced by
feelings of new-found satisfaction and, albeit arguable,
safety from registered sex offenders.160
Unfortunately, on occasion, emotional stickiness
appears to be the goal, even when the proposed legislation
fails to match the actual facts of the crime. Consider
“Carlie’s Law,” the congressional bill introduced by
Representative Katherine Harris (R-Fla.) and named after
eleven-year-old Carlie Brucia, who was murdered by a drug
addict.161 The bill was aimed at strengthening laws against
convicted sexual predators and human traffickers, however,
Representative Harris attached Carlie’s name to the bill
even though Carlie’s killer was neither a convicted sex
offender nor a human trafficker.162

combat these killing); Joseph F. Sullivan, Law Makers Get Tough on Sex
Offenders, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1994, at B4 (reporting the community anger over
the death of young girls at the hands of male neighbors).
159. An excellent example of an emotional message that produced new
legislation is the story of Sherrice Iverson, who was killed by Jeremy
Strohmeyer in a Nevada casino bathroom while his friend, David Cash, may
have been aware. See infra notes 169-71 and accompanying text.
160. Whether Megan’s Law does, in fact, protect the community is the subject
of debate. See, e.g., Elizabeth Garfinkle, Coming of Age in America: The
Misapplication of Sex-Offender Registration and Community-Notification Laws
to Juveniles, 91 CAL. L. REV. 163 (2003) (contending that community notification
statutes are ineffective as applied to juveniles); Jeffrey C. Sandler, Naomi J.
Freeman & Kelly M. Socia, Does a Watched Pot Boil? A Time-Series Analysis of
New York State’s Sex Offender Registration and Notification Law, 14 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL’Y & L. 284 (2008) (calling into question whether it is efficient to utilize
so many resources on repeat offenders when 95% of those arrested are first time
offenders).
161. H.R. 3107, 109th Cong. (2005).
162. See Cheryl Little et al., supra note 129, at 1189; see also Krajicek, supra
note 129 (describing the events surrounding Carlie’s abduction and murder by
Joe Smith). Carlie’s father acquiesced in naming the bill after Carlie although
he conceded that Carlie’s killer did not share the attributes of those targeted in
the bill. Crimeshots.com, In Loving Memory of Carlie Brucia,
http://crimeshots.com/CarlieBrucia11.html (last visited Dec. 6, 2009).
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Stories.Narratives are the way we fill in the gaps in our
perceptions of the world.163 Indeed, “anecdotal narratives,”
particularly stories with dramatic and lurid details, often
were the center of the congressional discussion on sex
offender registration laws164 or the foundational storytelling
for court opinions.165
On several levels—all incredibly sad—the murder of
Megan Kanka worked as a sticky story because it provided
the nation with information not previously considered.
First, it informed the public that a convicted sex offender
was able to live in the neighborhood “in plain sight.” Second,
the focus on the previous convictions of the offender further
informed the public that convicted sex offenders are likely
to recidivate. Finally, and most alarming to the public at
the time, publicity about Megan’s death led to the dawning
realization that law enforcement was not required to notify
the public about the presence of the sex offender in the
community.
Additionally, as Heath and Heath explain, stories not
only provide an audience with knowledge previously
unknown to it, good stories can help inspire an audience to
act.166 The story about Megan Kanka’s murder also worked
because it motivated people to demand community
notification laws, first at the state level167 and then
nationwide.168
Another “story” that inspired legislative action concerns
the murder of seven-year-old Sherrice Iverson by Jeremy
Strohmeyer in a Nevada casino bathroom during his

163. See Robert M. Cover, Foreword, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV.
4, 5 (1983) (“[L]aw and narrative are inseparably related.”).
164. See Filler, supra note 135, at 330-32 (reporting that every senator who
spoke in favor of the passage of Megan’s Law recounted a vivid and disturbing
case of sexual abuse).
165. See, e.g., State v. Cook, 700 N.E.2d 570, 573 (Ohio 1998) (opening the
decision with the murder of Megan Kanka).
166. HEATH & HEATH, supra note 40, at 206.
167. See E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1081 (3d Cir. 1997) (“Public reaction
to Megan’s murder was intense, and New Jersey’s governor and legislature
responded quickly.”).
168. See Filler, supra note 135, at 315-17 (offering an historical look at the
passage of Megan’s Law and its aftermath).
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attempted molestation of her.169 But the aspect of the case
that captured the public’s attention was not about the
murderer. Rather, attention focused on Strohmeyer’s friend,
David Cash, who witnessed at least part of the attempted
molestation, but failed to intervene or report the assault to
authorities.170 Incensed to learn that David Cash could not
be charged criminally for failing to intervene, the public
demanded a change in the laws to require persons to
intervene on behalf of a child who is the victim of a violent
crime.171 At its core, this sticky story not only provided the
public with information not previously known regarding the
lack of criminal penalties for the failure to rescue, the story
also inspired legislative action to redress the gap.172
C. The Power of Context
In addition to a compelling message and the core people
who spread it, all epidemics are triggered by key
environmental forces.173 The term “environmental forces,” is
broad enough to contemplate a myriad of events and
conditions that may impact the spread of an epidemic—
however direct or remote that event or condition may be.174
After all, a central premise underlying the structure of an
epidemic is that “little causes can have big effects.”175 In the
169. See, e.g., Teen Admits Killing Young Girl in Casino, NEWSDAY (Long
Island), Sept. 9, 1998, at A15 (relating the events surrounding the murder).
170. See Steve Chapman, Should Doing Nothing About A Crime Be A Crime?
CHI. TRIB., Aug. 27, 1998, § 1, at 23 (reporting that David Cash admitted to
seeing Strohmeyer struggle with Sherrice Iverson in the bathroom stall before
walking out of the restroom).
171. See, e.g., Call for Samaritan Law out of Child-Sex Case: Penalties for
Witnesses Who Don’t Report, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 10, 1998, at A2; Stacy Finz,
Killing of Girl, 7, in Casino Spurs Good Samaritan Bills, S.F. CHRON., Dec 9,
1998, at A21 (relating the public’s anger over the inability to charge Cash).
172. In response, California and Nevada passed laws criminalizing the failure
to intervene. See Sherrice Iverson Child Victim Protection Act, CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 152.3 (West Supp. 2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202.882 (LexisNexis 2006).
173. See GLADWELL, supra note 1, at 133-92 (highlighting a variety of
examples to demonstrate the importance of environmental factors to an
epidemic).
174. Consider Professor Friedman’s excellent analysis of the potential impact
of the telephone or the automobile on the law and legal institutions. See
Friedman, supra note 47, at 1584-86.
175. GLADWELL, supra note 1, at 9.
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context of legislative epidemics, this section explores several
factors that often converge to create an environment ripe for
sweeping criminal legislation: the public’s changing
perception about crime and punishment;176 the interrelated
consideration of the public’s fearfulness; and finally, the
lack of judicial oversight because of deference to legislative
intent. These factors coalesce to create an environment
conducive to produce an ever increasing and harsher set of
laws—runaway legislation.177
1. Fear and Loathing in Las Vegas178 and Everywhere
Else. Both a cause and effect, the public thirst for harsher
punishments stands at the center of a spate of recent
legislative enactments.179 Theorists suggest various factors
that have contributed to the shift toward a new penology of
retribution and vengeance,180 but the narrow consideration I
wish to examine in this section is the public’s perception
that it is not safe from strangers residing in their
communities. The fear is palpable. Despite downward turns
in violent crimes throughout much of the last two decades,181
opinion polls continue to reflect that the public fears what it
176. See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, What’s Law Got to Do with It? The Political,
Social, Psychological and Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development
of (Federal) Criminal Law, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 23 (1997) (exploring why the
public favors harsh crimes and punishments in the face of countermanding
evidence); William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119
HARV. L. REV. 780, 781 (2006) (contending that the harsh justice of the 1970s
was in response to the “constitutional proceduralism” of the 1960s).
177. See infra Part III.A and accompanying text.
178. The title of this section is taken from the 1998 movie of the same name,
which was adapted from the 1971 novel by HUNTER S. THOMPSON, FEAR AND
LOATHING IN LAS VEGAS: A SAVAGE JOURNEY TO THE HEART OF THE AMERICAN
DREAM (Second Vintage Books 1998) (1971).
179. See infra Part III.A and accompanying text (providing legislative
examples of the shift in public attitude on crimes).
180. See, e.g., MICHAEL TONRY, THINKING ABOUT CRIME: SENSE AND SENSIBILITY
AMERICAN PENAL CULTURE (2004) (examining various reasons for the shift in
penal attitudes).
IN

181. See, e.g., LORI DORFMAN & VINCENT SCHIRALDI, BLDG. BLOCKS OF YOUTH,
OFF BALANCE: YOUTH, RACE & CRIME IN THE NEWS 3 (2001),
http://www.buildingblocksforyouth.org/media/media.pdf
(“Although
violent
crime by youth in 1998 was at its lowest point in the 25-year history of the
National Crime Victimization Survey, 62% of poll respondents felt that juvenile
crime was on the increase.”).
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perceives to be escalating crime.182 There is a palpable fear
among ordinary citizens that children are vulnerable to
sexual abuse by strangers. This is an especially interesting
perception, given that nearly eighty percent of sexual abuse
of children is committed by family members.183
In speaking of what informs our world view, political
journalist Walter Lippmann said that we depend on
“‘pictures in our heads,’ many of them delivered by the news
media, to tell us about the world.”184 A survey conducted on
this point indicates the truth of this proposition. Seventy-six
percent of respondents reported that they form opinions
about crime from the news rather than from personal
experience.185 If most Americans frame their world view
from the media, there is no question that a frightening
schema has been created for us: our communities are not
safe, our children are not safe, and our laws are weak
responses to these dire conditions.186
In short, we are panicked and frightened.187 To historian
Philip Jenkins, the “panic” is not only marked by
widespread public fear, but “fear that is wildly exaggerated
and wrongly directed.”188 Whether it is the early responses
182. Id. at 9.
183. See Richard G. Wright, Sex Offender Post-Incarceration Sanctions: Are
There Any Limits?, 34 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 17, 21-25
(2008) (reporting statistics to support the position that sexual assault by a
stranger is an “infrequently occurring event”).
184. DORFMAN & SCHIRALDI, supra note 181, at 4 (quoting LIPPMANN, supra
note 137, at 3).
185. Id.
186. For an excellent discussion of the media’s role in creating an alarming
picture, see Sara Sun Beale, The News Media’s Influence on Criminal Justice
Policy: How Market-Driven News Promotes Punitiveness, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV.
397 (2006).
187. See generally PHILIP JENKINS, MORAL PANIC: CHANGING CONCEPTS OF THE
CHILD MOLESTER IN MODERN AMERICA (1998) (condemning the societal response
to sexual offenses as highly disproportionate to the offenses).
188. Id. at 6-7; see also John Douard, Sex Offender as Scapegoat: The
Monstrous Other Within, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 31, 41 (2008/2009) (“[S]ex
offenders are the targets of ‘moral panic.’”). On the rampant escalation of sex
offender registration laws, see, for example, Wayne A. Logan, Constitutional
Collectivism and Ex-Offender Residence Exclusion Laws, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1, 6
(2006), who argues that sex offenders are the recipients of the harshest
“punitive zeal.”
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to the HIV/AIDS crisis,189 or the escalating laws against
convicted sex offenders,190 the hallmarks of a societal panic
are the same:
When the official reaction to a person, groups of persons or series
of events is out of all proportion to the actual threat offered, when
experts, in the form of police chiefs, the judiciary, politicians and
editors perceive the threat in all but identical terms, and appear to
talk with one voice of rates, diagnoses, prognoses and solutions,
when the media representations universally stress sudden and
dramatic increases . . . then we believe it is appropriate to speak
of a moral panic.191

What has caused this fear? Today, scholars connect the
increase in the media’s reporting of crime to the public’s
belief that crime is rampant.192 Despite clear evidence that
crime has declined,193 the public believes that crime has
escalated,194 in large measure due to the emphasis on crime
189. In the context of HIV transmission, the 1980s was the height of societal
panic. See Jerry Estell, Ind. Youth Tells of Fight Against AIDS—and Bias,
PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 4, 1988, at A15 (detailing the panicked actions as schools
barred HIV infected students from school, homes were firebombed, and families
were forced to move); Deborah Hurst, Houston Boy with AIDS Virus Barred
from School, HOUSTON CHRON., Apr. 23, 1987, at 11 (reporting that a Houston
child was barred from school); Herb Michaelson, School Battles Leave Own
Scars, SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 10, 1986, at A20.
190. See infra Part III.A and accompanying text.
191. Philip Jenkins, Failure to Launch: Why Do Some Social Issues Fail to
Detonate Moral Panics?, 49 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 35, 35 (2009) (quoting STUART
HALL ET AL., POLICING THE CRISIS: MUGGING, THE STATE, AND LAW AND ORDER 16
(1978)).
192. David A. Singleton, Sex Offender Residency Statutes and the Culture of
Fear: The Case for More Meaningful Rational Basis Review of Fear-Driven
Public Safety Laws, 3 ST. THOMAS L.J. 600, 602-03 (2006) (arguing that the
proliferation of crime reports induced the proliferation of sex offender
registration laws); cf. Ctr. for HIV Law & Policy, The National Legal Resource
and Strategy Center for HIV Advocacy, http://www.hivlawandpolicy.or
g/resourceCategories/view/2 (last visited Dec. 6, 2009) (claiming that media
coverage which demonized those inflicted with HIV/AIDS influenced a backlash
that resulted in the myriad of AIDS criminal legislation).
193. See, e.g., Beale, supra note 186, at 409 (referencing Bureau of Justice
Statistics that note unprecedented drop in crime).
194. See DORFMAN & SCHIRALDI, supra note 181, at 5 (citing a Baltimore
survey where, despite declining crime rates, residents believed that crime was
on the rise).
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by the media.195 The proliferation of sex offender
registration laws has been linked to the increased media
coverage of child abuse cases involving previously convicted
sex offenders.196 One additional fact contributes to this
perception. Showcasing high-profile, but rare crimes, turns
the symbolic into the pervasive in the eyes of the public. The
effect is a skewed perception of the likelihood that the crime
will be repeated.197
There is a corollary to the proposition that media
reporting fuels the public’s demand for additional criminal
laws. Expanding criminal laws also signals to the public
that crime must be escalating because of the increased
attention and resources spent on promoting the added
legislation.198
Fear is motivating. The public mood on crime and
punishment has undoubtedly changed. Commentators have
observed that discourse on punishment has shifted from
rehabilitation to vengeance and retribution—or what has
195. See Beale, supra note 186, at 422-23 (noting that crime news stories on
the three major networks grew from 557 stories to 2574 in a five-year time
frame).
196. See Singleton, supra note 192, at 604-05 (tracking the increase in articles
on child abductions since 1981).
197. The testimony of the President of the National Center for Missing &
Exploited Children who appeared before the Judiciary Committee in March
2009 articulates well the role of high-profile cases:
In recent years, millions of Americans have followed with horror the
devastating stories of Jessica Lunsford, Sarah Lunde, Jetseta Gage and
others. These tragic cases have generated anger and indignation
nationwide, and epitomize an area of great concern: how to effectively
track, register and manage the nation’s convicted sex offenders. . . .
[Sex offenders] evoke unparalleled fear among citizens.
Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SONRA): Barriers to Timely
Compliance by States: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism,
and Homeland Security, 111th Cong. 81 (2009) [hereinafter SONRA] (statement
of Ernie Allen, CEO & President, National Center for Missing & Exploited
Children).
198. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and
Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 352 (1997) (“[V]isible efforts by private citizens to
protect themselves from crime may convey the message that criminality is
rampant.”). Interestingly, the absence of media attention can produce a dearth
of legislation, even where legislation is warranted and necessary. See Jenkins,
supra note 191, at 41 (maintaining that the lack of comprehensive child
pornography laws may be due to the lack of media access).
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been termed, “populist punitiveness.”199 Scholar David
Garland states in The Culture of Control,200 “[From the late
1970s onward] it became common to regard the core value of
the whole penal-welfare framework not just as an
impossible ideal, but, much more remarkably, as an
unworthy, even dangerous policy objective that was counterproductive in its effects and misguided in its objectives.”201
Part of the shift away from rehabilitation has occurred
because there “is a growing sense that little or nothing can
be done to change offenders. The optimism that informed
18th and 19th century penal theorists has been replaced by
a pragmatic pessimism that assumes little effectiveness to
efforts at transformation.”202 The modern day mindset,
without a belief that rehabilitation can succeed, gravitates
toward harsher penalties.203
Elected officials serve as interesting aiders and
abettors—some might even say symbiotic partners—in the
public’s shift in attitude. Eager to please their constituents,
politicians stoke the public’s fear and consequential thirst
199. See Philip Whitehead, Penal Populism, Sentencing Councils and
Sentencing Policy, 49 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 430, 432 (2009) (book review) (noting
that there is an “atmosphere of populist punitiveness”). For scholarship on the
shift in public attitude, see, for example, Paul Almond, Public Perceptions of
Work-Related Fatality Cases, 48 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 448, 449 (2008), for a
review of research that demonstrates the change in public attitude; Beale, supra
note 176, at 44-51, for an exploration of why the public favors harsh
punishments in the face of countermanding evidence; and Samuel Jan Brakel &
James L. Cavanaugh, Jr., Of Psychopaths and Pendulums: Legal and
Psychiatric Treatment of Sex Offenders in the United States, 30 N.M. L. REV. 69,
69 (2000), for a description of the shift in attitude as the “pendulum effect.”
200. DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2001).

OF

CONTROL: CRIME

AND

SOCIAL ORDER

IN

201. Id. at 8.
202. Jonathan Simon, Managing the Monstrous: Sex Offenders and the New
Penology, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 452, 454 (1998). With respect to sex
offender registration laws specifically, Simon criticizes what he calls the “new
penology” which includes a public that is more concerned with management of
high risk offenders than rehabilitation and transformation. Id. at 454-56.
203. In an interesting swing of the pendulum, rehabilitation is reemerging as
a penal goal. Not because the public has gained new-found optimism, but rather
because the costs of incarceration can no longer be accommodated in a failing
economy. See, e.g., Michael Rothfeld, The California Fix: Prison Cuts Easier
Said than Done, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2009, at A1 (describing efforts to
reintroduce programs of rehabilitation to drive incarceration costs down).
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for more punitive laws with “electoral cycle” legislation
designed to appeal to the voters.204 As one court
acknowledged, “[T]he public’s increasing awareness of the
dangers posed by sex offenders . . . was accelerated by the
occurrence of highly publicized and horrific offenses.”205 And
it is not only the state-elected officials who are speaking
out. Criminal matters that would have been left to state and
local governments have now moved to the national stage.206
Federally-elected officials, like their state counterparts, are
also eager to respond to the national cry for stricter laws
and penalties.
Everyone agrees—fear sells.207 And supporting populist
legislation is compelling. Of that there is little question.
204. See Lindsay A. Wagner, Comment, Sex Offender Residency Restrictions:
How Common Sense Places Children at Risk, 1 DREXEL L. REV. 175, 179 (citing
NAOMI MURAKAWA, ELECTING TO PUNISH: CONGRESS, RACE, AND THE AMERICAN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATE 140 (2005)); see also Simon, supra note 202, at 455
(“The politicians, bolstered by what is taken to be nearly universal public
support, compete to propose ever more severe responses to criminal behavior.”).
205. Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 375-76 (N.J. 1995).
206. A proffered rationale for the increased federalization is the belief that a
uniform set of laws better protects the citizenry. See Wayne A. Logan, Criminal
Justice Federalism and National Sex Offender Policy, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 51,
56 (2008) (outlining the wave of federalized criminal laws).
207. See, e.g., 154 CONG. REC. S10,300-01 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 2008) (statement of
Sen. Schumer) (“[S]ocial networking web sites . . . [are] potential hotbeds for
sexual predators, who can easily camouflage themselves amidst the throng of
users on these sites, while furtively pursuing their own despicable designs.”);
154 CONG. REC. S8976-01 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 2008) (statement of Sen. Martinez)
(“Public safety is among the highest priorities of Government. Americans should
feel—and have a right to feel—safe in their homes, their neighborhoods, and
their communities. Although the national violent crime rate has dropped
substantially since 2000, we know any crime is too much crime. As elected
officials, we ought to do what we can to prevent criminal acts.” (emphasis
added)); 154 CONG. REC. H6441-42 (daily ed. July 14, 2008) (statement of Rep.
Schiff) (urging continued funding for a provision of the PROTECT Act of 2003
that allowed state and local government access to national fingerprint databases
for volunteers who work with children, although only six percent of all
volunteers tested under the program had serious criminal records); see also
Stephanie Chen, iPhone Apps Help Track Sex Offenders, Spot Crime, CNN,
Sept. 30, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/09/29/iphone.app.fight.crime/i
ndex.html (reporting that the Offender Locator application, which provides the
location of sex offenders, has been downloaded more than a million times in the
three months since its debut in June 2009 and is among the ten most popular
iPod applications).
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“The societal pressure for legislation designed to prevent
terrible tragedies such as befell Megan Kanka and her
parents is hydraulic.”208 But it is also true that legislation
derived from emotionally-based incentives is fraught with
dangers in drafting. As Professor J. Kelly Strader observed
in writing on HIV criminal legislation, “When faced with
the politically risky and intellectually challenging tasks of
developing responses to our nation’s crises, our policymakers often opt for politically safe and intellectually easy
approaches.”209
An interesting by-product of “ramping up” criminal
penalties in one community is its spillover effect. A more
aggressive sex offender registration scheme in one
jurisdiction, for example, moves offenders out of that
community into neighboring communities. It is not a “race
to the bottom” as much as it is a “race to the harshest.”
Competitive lawmaking inevitably pits jurisdictions against
each other as each community tries to create harsher sets of
laws, not only to punish those who live within their borders,
but to insulate them from criminal actors who might think
twice about choosing to reside there.210
2. Role of the Judiciary. Shifting attitudes and a fearful
public help foster an environment conducive to sweeping
criminal legislation, but without a complicit judiciary, no
epidemic could flourish. At the heart of runaway legislation,
therefore, is a judiciary that has allowed it.

208. E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1112 (3d Cir. 1997) (Becker, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part); see also Artway v. Att’y Gen., 81 F.3d
1235, 1243 (3d Cir. 1996) (“[Megan’s Law] was rushed to the Assembly floor as
an emergency measure, skipping the committee process, and was debated only
on the floor; no member voted against it.”).
209. J. Kelly Strader, Criminalization as a Policy Response to a Public Health
Crisis, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 435, 435-40 (1994) (analyzing the myriad of HIV
criminal legislation passed in response to the HIV/AIDS crisis).
210. For a thoughtful discussion of the “jurisdictional competition” model, see
Darryl K. Brown, Prosecutors and Overcriminalization: Thoughts on Political
Dynamics and a Doctrinal Response, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 453, 453-56 (2009).
For the impact of the competition model as applied to residency restrictions, see
Corey Rayburn Yung, Banishment by a Thousand Laws: Residency Restrictions
on Sex Offenders, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 101, 104 (2007), who contends that “the
amount of real estate available to sex offenders will continue to decrease and
more sex offender communities will emerge.”
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In the case of sex offender registration laws, the most
influential contextual factor has not been a public clamoring
for these laws or even the politicians eager to satisfy their
constituents. Rather, it was the United States Supreme
Court’s acquiescence to the public panic in the form of two
decisions: Smith v. Doe211 and Connecticut Department of
Public Safety v. Doe.212
The year was 2003. By that time, sex offender
registration laws and community notification statutes had
been in effect nationwide for approximately seven years.213
A variety of challenges had been raised and appeals were
winding their way through state and federal courts.214 A
showdown was expected in the United States Supreme
Court.
Because sex offender registration laws comprise both
civil and criminal characteristics, the critical threshold
issue is whether these laws are designed as civil remedies
or criminal penalties. Fundamental to the outcome of their
characterization are twin propositions: criminal laws, even
those labeled as civil remedies, must afford constitutional
protections to criminal defendants215 while civil nonpunitive
regulations do not require the same adherence to
substantive and procedural safeguards.216
211. 538 U.S. 84 (2003).
212. 538 U.S. 1 (2003).
213. See 42 U.S.C. § 14071(g)(2)(A)-(B) (2006) (mandating that states must
comply with provisions or face decreased funding).
214. See, e.g., Doe v. Pataki, 3 F. Supp. 2d 456 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (arguing that
registration laws impact protected liberty interests); Cutshall v. Sundquist, 980
F. Supp. 928 (M.D. Tenn. 1997) (raising a number of claims including whether
the Tennessee Sexual Offender and Registration and Monitoring Act violates
double jeopardy, the right to travel, and equal protection); Helman v. State, 784
A.2d 1058 (Del. 2001) (questioning whether juveniles should be subjected to
these laws); Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367 (N.J. 1995) (challenging whether the
newly enacted laws apply to previously convicted sex offenders).
215. See, e.g., United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980) (“The
distinction between a civil penalty and a criminal penalty is of some
constitutional import.”).
216. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (concluding that civil
commitment requirements were sufficiently tailored to meet nonpunitive
purpose); accord Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 263 (2001) (deciding that
commitment of sexually violent felons was a civil remedy that did not impact
the constitutionality of the statute under ex post facto or double jeopardy
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In the case of sex offender registration schemes, and at
each stage, nearly all lower courts agreed that these laws do
not infringe on protected liberty interests but are only civil
remedial actions designed to protect the community.217 One
leading lower court decision was Doe v. Poritz,218 which was
among the first to conclude that “[t]he Registration and
Notification Laws are not retributive laws, but laws
designed to give people a chance to protect themselves and
their children.”219 The Poritz majority wrote:
The essence of our decision is that the Constitution does not
prevent society from attempting to protect itself from convicted
sex offenders, no matter when convicted, so long as the means of
protection are reasonably designed for that purpose and only for
that purpose, and not designed to punish.220

clauses); see also infra note 217 (citing sex offender registration cases that have
concluded the laws are civil remedies and not criminal penalties).
217. See, e.g., Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1087-88 (9th Cir. 1997)
(concluding that these laws were regulatory, not punitive in nature); Doe v.
Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263, 1285 (2d Cir. 1997) (determining that registration and
notification provisions did not inflict punishment); People v. Castellanos, 982
P.2d 211, 217 (Cal. 1999) (“The sex offender registration requirement serves an
important and proper remedial purpose, and it does not appear that the
Legislature intended the registration requirement to constitute punishment.”);
State v. Cook, 700 N.E.2d 570, 578 (Ohio 1998) (“Consequently, we find that the
registration and verification provisions are remedial in nature and do not
violate the ban on retroactive laws set forth [under the Ohio Constitution].”);
Commonwealth v. Gaffney, 733 A.2d 616, 621 (Pa. 1999) (finding that
registration is not punitive).
218. 662 A.2d 367 (N.J. 1995).
219. Id. at 372-73.
220. Id. at 372. Other courts have affirmed the power of the legislature to
protect its citizenry. See, e.g., E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1097 (3d Cir.
1997) (“[W]e found that the legislative purpose of Megan’s Law was to identify
potential recidivists and alert the public when necessary for the public safety,
and to help prevent and promptly resolve incidents involving sexual abuse and
missing persons.”); Lee v. State, 895 So. 2d 1038, 1040 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004)
(“‘The Legislature finds that the danger of recidivism posed by criminal sex
offenders and that the protection of the public from these offenders is a
paramount concern or interest to government.’” (quoting ALA. CODE § 15-2026(a) (1975))); Fredenburg v. City of Fremont, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 437, 439 (Ct.
App. 2004) (“[T]he [California] Legislature further found that the public had a
‘compelling and necessary . . . interest’ in obtaining information about released
sex offenders so they can ‘adequately protect themselves and their children from
these persons.’” (quoting 1996 Cal. Stat., ch. 908 § 1(b))).
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This is not to suggest that registration requirements are
inconsequential. Indeed, as courts have often noted, they
present serious burdens to the registrant that involve
significant intrusions into the individual’s privacy
interest.221 Despite their burdensome nature, however, the
vast majority of lower courts concluded that sex offender
registration laws were remedial and nonpunitive.222 This
position is not unassailable. Some jurists at that time
expressed significant concern that registration laws and
community notification statutes, with their devastating
punitive consequences, were in actuality criminal penalties
masquerading as civil remedies.223
The stage was set, therefore, when the United States
Supreme Court heard Smith and Connecticut Department of
221. See, e.g., Doe v. Pryor, 61 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1226 (M.D. Ala. 1999)
(characterizing Alabama’s registration scheme as “among the . . . most
restrictive of such laws in the nation”); Doe v. Pataki, 3 F. Supp. 2d 456, 468
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (“[T]he registration provisions of the Act place a ‘tangible
burden’ on plaintiffs, potentially for the rest of their lives.”); Doe v. Dep’t of Pub.
Safety, 92 P.3d 398, 409 (Alaska 2004) (reiterating the burdensome nature of
Alaska’s registration requirements); State v. Robinson, 873 So. 2d 1205, 1213
(Fla. 2004) (“We believe the Act imposes more than a stigma.”); State v. Myers,
923 P.2d 1024, 1041 (Kan. 1996) (“The practical effect of such unrestricted
dissemination could make it impossible for the offender to find housing or
employment.”).
222. See State v. Bollig, 605 N.W.2d 199, 205-06 (Wis. 2000) (“Although we
recognize that sex offenders have suffered adverse consequences, including
vandalism, loss of employment, and community harassment, the punitive or
deterrent effects resulting from registration and the subsequent dissemination
of information do not obviate the remedial and protective intent underlying
those requirements.”); accord State ex rel. Olivieri v. State, 779 So. 2d 735, 749
(La. 2001) (explaining that any economic burden on the sex offender resulting
from the notification scheme is a necessary result of a “well justified system”);
Young v. State, 806 A.2d 233, 249 (Md. 2002) (concluding that although the sex
offender registration statute does place affirmative burdens on the registrants,
these burdens are not unreasonable in light of the statute’s remedial aims).
223. See, e.g., Verniero, 119 F.3d at 1112-29 (Becker, J., concurring &
dissenting) (analogizing community notification statutes to shaming
punishments); Doe v. Att’y Gen., 686 N.E.2d 1007 (Mass. 1997) (concluding that
sex offender registration laws are unconstitutional in the absence of a right to a
hearing for a determination of whether actor poses a risk); Poritz, 662 A.2d at
424-28 (Stein, J., dissenting) (rejecting the majority’s position that the laws
were not punitive in nature). This view is gaining hold. See infra notes 311-27
and accompanying text (discussing recent decisions that have found sex offender
registration laws are punitive in nature).
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Public Safety. The constitutional challenges were slightly
different in each case. Smith addressed whether a
previously convicted offender could successfully challenge
on ex post facto grounds registration laws enacted after his
conviction.224 Connecticut Department of Public Safety
concerned whether procedural due process demands a
hearing to determine the offender’s level of dangerousness
as a prerequisite to inclusion in the state registry.225 Yet,
central to both cases was whether registration and
community notification laws were so punitive in effect that
they were actually criminal penalties masquerading as civil
remedies.
To be sure, existing law guides the Court on whether a
law is regulatory or punitive. The seven-factor test from
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez is instructive,226 with two of
the seven factors framing the issue. Called the “two-part
intent-effects test,” the first factor critically examines the
legislative characterization of the statute, asking whether
the legislature intended for the law to be a civil remedy. The
second part of the “intent-effects” test asks whether, despite
the legislature’s intent to create a civil remedy, the law is
nonetheless punitive in its effect.227
224. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003).
225. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003).
226. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963). Kennedy
delineates the following seven factors to determine whether a law is regulatory
or punitive in its effect:
[1] Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,
[2] whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, [3]
whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, [4] whether its
operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution
and deterrence, [5] whether the behavior to which it applies is already
a crime, [6] whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally
be connected is assignable for it, and [7] whether it appears excessive in
relation to the alternative purpose assigned.
Id. (citations omitted).
227. See Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99, 103 (1997) (rejecting double
jeopardy claim in administrative hearings following criminal prosecution,
deeming them civil under the Mendoza-Martinez “intent-effects test”); see also
People v. Logan, 705 N.E.2d 152, 158-60 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (employing the
“intent-effects” test to determine whether sex offender registration statute was
constitutional); Poritz, 662 A.2d at 433 (Stein, J., dissenting) (observing the
judicial evolution from the Mendoza-Martinez seven-factor test to the two-part
intents-effects test).
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It is axiomatic that great deference is afforded
legislative enactments.228 In the case of whether a law is
designed as a criminal penalty or civil remedy, courts afford
great deference to clear legislative statements of
nonpunitive rationales.229 Specifically, as applied to sex
offender registration laws, courts look to the state’s
expressed legislative intent that sex offender registration
laws are designed with an alternative nonpunitive
purpose—the protection of the citizenry.230 Not surprisingly,
most states use very similar introductory language that is
intended to signal that the registration scheme is designed
“to protect, not to punish.”231 Key features in the
“declaration of purpose” language include identification of
the risk that sex offenders pose, the governmental interest
in protecting the public, and the determination that
protecting the public outweighs the registrant’s privacy
228. See, e.g., Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957) (observing the
wide latitude given to the legislature’s authority to define an offense); State v.
Cook, 700 N.E.2d 570, 576 (Ohio 1998) (“‘An enactment of the General Assembly
is presumed to be constitutional . . . .’” (quoting State ex rel. Dickman v.
Defenbacher, 128 N.E.2d 59 (Ohio 1955))); In re Christopher S., 776 A.2d 1054,
1057 (R.I. 2001) (“‘This [C]ourt’s evaluation of legislative enactments has been
extremely deferential . . . .’” (quoting City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40,
44-45 (R.I. 1995) (alteration in original))).
229. See Hudson, 522 U.S. at 103 (“It is evident that Congress intended the
OCC money penalties and debarment sanctions imposed for violations of 12
U.S.C. §§ 84 and 375b to be civil in nature.”); United States v. Ward, 448 U.S.
242, 248-49 (1980) (recognizing clear congressional intent to characterize
monetary penalties under the Clean Water Act as civil in nature).
230. See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 110 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring)
(“What tips the scale for me is the presumption of constitutionality normally
accorded a State’s law. That presumption gives the State the benefit of the
doubt in close cases like this one . . . .”); see also Poritz, 662 A.2d at 374
(majority opinion) (“Such a legislative determination is beyond judicial review.”).
231. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-902 (2003) (“[P]rotecting the public from
sex offenders is a primary governmental interest, [and] that the privacy interest
of the persons adjudicated guilty of sex offenses is less important than the
government’s interest in public safety . . . .”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-A,
§ 11201 (Supp. 2007) (“The purpose of the chapter is to protect the public from
potentially dangerous registrants by enhancing access to information concerning
those registrants.”); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.721a (West 2004) (“The
legislature has determined that a person who has been convicted of committing
an offense covered by this act poses a potential serious menace and danger to
the health, safety, morals, and welfare of the people, and particularly the
children, of this state.”).
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interest. Arkansas’s declaration of purpose mirrors the
language from many other states and serves as a good
example:
The General Assembly finds that sex offenders pose a high risk of
reoffending after release from custody, that protecting the public
from sex offenders is a primary governmental interest, that the
privacy interest of persons adjudicated guilty of sex offenses is
less important than the government’s interest in public safety,
and that the release of certain information about sex offenders to
criminal justice agencies and the general public will assist in
protecting public safety.232

In fact, some jurisdictions employ nearly identical language
in characterizing the state’s sex offender registration
scheme as nonpunitive.233
It would be inaccurate, however, to suggest that courts
have concluded that sex offender registration laws are
designed purely with a nonpunitive purpose. Courts
recognize that, even though these laws protect the
community, they also serve to shame, isolate, and ostracize
232. ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-902 (2003); see also, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 18-8302 (2004) (“The legislature finds that sexual offenders present a
significant risk of reoffense and that efforts of law enforcement agencies to
protect their communities, conduct investigations and quickly apprehend
offenders who commit sexual offenses are impaired by the lack of current
information available about individuals who have been convicted of sexual
offenses who live within their jurisdiction. The legislature further finds that
providing public access to certain information about convicted sexual offenders
assists parents in the protection of their children.”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 15:540 (2005) (“[P]rotection of the public from sex offenders, sexually violent
predators, and child predators is of paramount governmental interest.”); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 45-33-21 (West Supp. 2008) (“The Legislature finds that the danger
of recidivism posed by criminal sex offenders and the protection of the public
from these offenders is of paramount concern and interest to government.”).
233. Compare NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-4002 (2008) (“The Legislature finds that
sex offenders present a high risk to commit repeat offenses. The Legislature
further finds that efforts of law enforcement agencies to protect their
communities, conduct investigations, and quickly apprehend sex offenders are
impaired by the lack of available information about individuals who have
pleaded guilty to or have been found guilty of sex offenses and who live, work, or
attend school in their jurisdiction.”), with N.M. STAT § 29-11A-2 (2004) (“The
legislature finds that: (1) sex offenders pose a significant risk of recidivism; and
(2) the efforts of law enforcement agencies to protect their communities from sex
offenders are impaired by the lack of information available concerning sex
offenders who live within the agencies’ jurisdictions.”).
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the convicted offender.234 And sadly, stigma often draws
violence and harassment.235 One of the fallacies inherent in
a registration scheme that broadly paints the sex offender is
the public’s perception that all registrants are violent sexual
predators who reoffend regularly. That is, after all, the
value of this particular sticky message. However, contrary
to this belief, not all registrants are violent sexual
predators. Registerable offenses include consensual sexual
activity between teenagers, urinating in public, flashing and
streaking, and visiting prostitutes.236 For those convicted of
these offenses, registration, and more specifically
community notification, has devastating and far-reaching
consequences. As one trial court stated, “[O]nly a person
protected by legal training from the ordinary way people
think, could say, with a straight face that this terrible
consequence of a sex offender’s conviction is not
punishment.”237 Because registries include violent and
nonviolent offenders without separate designations,
Internet notification sites create misleading impressions
about the offenders listed.238 Options for employment and

234. See, e.g., Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 829 (9th Cir. 1997) (“We can
hardly conceive of a state’s action bearing more ‘stigmatizing consequences’ than
the labeling of a prison inmate as a sex offender.”); Ray v. State, 982 P.2d 931,
936 (Idaho 1999) (“[R]egistration brings notoriety to a person convicted of a
sexual offense [and] does prolong the stigma attached to such convictions.”);
Young v. State, 806 A.2d 233, 249 (Md. 2002) (“Being labeled as a sexual
offender within the community can be highly stigmatizing and can carry the
potential for social ostracism.”).
235. See, e.g., Brandon Bain, Downside of Registries: Harassment, Vigilantism,
NEWSDAY (Long Island), Oct. 23, 2006, at A31 (recounting numerous examples of
vigilantism against registered offenders); see also Carpenter, supra note 100, at
301 n.16 (listing reports of harassment and violence against registered
offenders).
236. See Unjust and Ineffective, ECONOMIST, Aug. 8-14, 2009, at 21 (reporting
on registration-worthy offenses); see also Carpenter, supra note 100, at 338-70
(questioning whether sex offender registration is appropriate for strict liability
statutory rape).
237. Sigler v. State, No. 08-CA-79, 2009 WL 1145232, Ohio App. 5 Dist., at *1
(Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2009) (quoting the trial court, although reversing it).
238. See Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003) (addressing this
central issue in the case).
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housing diminish significantly, and the loss of reputation
they suffer is real and unending.239
And so, where the statute includes both punitive and
nonpunitive purposes, the second factor of the MendozaMartinez test is an important part of the equation: whether
the nonpunitive purpose alone could fairly justify the
sanction imposed.240 Though the legislature may intend that
the statute serves an alternative civil purpose, the “effects”
prong underscores an important point. A statute
nonetheless may be deemed a criminal penalty if it is “so
punitive either in purpose or effect . . . as to transform what
was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal
penalty.”241
And here is where the battle in the Supreme Court
should have been fought. Can it be said that sex offender
registration schemes are sufficiently tailored to meet
regulatory aims but not so punitive in their effect that they
are criminal penalties?242 In 2003, however, legislative
intent controlled. Concluding that these laws were based on
a significant alternative purpose, the Court determined that
sex offender registration schemes withstood the overarching
challenge that, under the “intent-effects” test from
Mendoza-Martinez, they were punitive in nature.243
239. See supra notes 221-22 (reporting the hardships registrants face in
meeting the requirements).
240. See Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 433 (N.J. 1995) (Stein, J., dissenting)
(explaining the second part of the “intent-effects” test).
241. Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997) (citations omitted)
(recognizing that it is largely an issue of statutory construction whether a
punishment is civil or criminal in nature); see also Artway v. Att’y Gen., 81 F.3d
1235, 1263 (3d Cir. 1996) (crafting a three-prong test of (i) actual purpose; (ii)
objective purpose, and (iii) effect to determine whether regulation was a civil or
criminal penalty).
242. See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 102 (2003) (“[A] rational connection to
a nonpunitive purpose is a ‘[m]ost significant’ factor in our determination that
the statute’s effects are nonpunitive.” (alterations in original) (quoting United
States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 290 (1996))); Young v. State, 806 A.2d 233, 250
(Md. 2002) (finding that registration provisions are tailored to protect the
public); cf. Meinders v. Weber, 604 N.W.2d 248, 260 (S.D. 2000) (concluding that
the legislature must be given deference in determining whether a statute is
excessive to its alternative purpose).
243. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 102-03 (“[T]he Act has a legitimate nonpunitive
purpose of public safety which is advanced by alerting the public to the risk of
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Since reliance on legislative intent is fundamental to
the jurisprudence, the Smith Court’s reasoning may not
give one pause.244 That is, until it is viewed in juxtaposition
with another case decided the same term: Lawrence v.
Texas,245 which overruled Bowers v. Hardwick246 to conclude
that the state of Texas did not have a rationally-related
purpose to criminalize sodomy.247 So dismissive was the
majority in Lawrence of the state’s purported legislative
intent, the analysis represents one sentence in the opinion:
“The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest
which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private
life of the individual.”248
Why the difference between Smith and Lawrence in
their approaches to legislative deference? In an interesting
take on the Court’s shift in Lawrence, one commentator
applied “tipping point analysis” to argue that the change in
environmental factors in the fifteen years between Bowers
and Lawrence compelled the Supreme Court’s reversal.249 So
undeniable was the Power of Context, the argument
continues, that the Lawrence outcome was preordained. By
comparison, in the area of sex offender registration laws,
2003 was marked by different environmental factors that
impacted the Smith analysis, including an angry public,
politicians unwilling to apply restraint, and judicial
deference to the original legislative intent of a nonpunitive
purpose. But, as Part III develops, the environment may
have changed since Smith. Ever-expanding sex offender
sex offenders in their communit[y].” (citation omitted) (second alteration in
original)); see also Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 538 U.S. at 4 (reinforcing the basic
premise that Connecticut’s registration scheme was “designed to protect its
communities from sex offenders”).
244. See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957) (“[D]eep in our law, is
the principle that of all the powers of local government, the police power is ‘one
of the least limitable.’” (quoting Dist. of Columbia v. Brooke, 214 U.S. 138, 149
(1909))).
245. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
246. 478 U.S. 186, 189 (1986) (upholding the legislative power to criminalize
sodomy), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
247. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
248. Id. at 578.
249. See Kaufman, supra note 39, at 435 (arguing that the Power of Context
was in effect in Lawrence in that environmental factors provided the Supreme
Court with the impetus to overrule Bowers).
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registration laws with their increasing punition may have
created an environment that encourages our questioning
whether sex offender registration schemes still retain their
nonpunitive characterization.250
III. THE DARK SIDE OF LEGISLATIVE EPIDEMICS
In the prior section, I reviewed the making of legislative
epidemics. In this section, I explore their vulnerability.
What is clear in tracking legislative epidemics is that after
the euphoria of the tip come the realities of application.
Some legislative epidemics have made the transition
smoothly from pre-passage hype to seamless application
and enforcement.251 However, this is also a cautionary tale
about laws created out of haste and emotion-laden rhetoric,
where under the bright glare of reflection fault lines are
exposed to reveal systemic problems that plague these
epidemics.
A. Runaway Legislation: A “Race to the Harshest”
As Gladwell explains, medical viruses have the capacity
to change.252 So too, does the legislative epidemic. Like the
HIV virus that mutated into a different and more virulent
form,253 the legislative epidemic sometimes mutates into a
second generation of laws that are harsher than the original
legislation. This is certainly the case with sex offender
registration laws which, in the years subsequent to Smith
and Connecticut Department of Public Safety, have become
what could be fairly described as runaway legislation.
250. See, e.g., State v. Pollard, 908 N.E.2d 1145, 1154 (Ind. 2009) (affirming
dismissal of violation of residency restriction); Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371,
384 (Ind. 2009) (rejecting the Smith analysis to conclude that, under Indiana’s
constitution, the sex offender registration scheme is punitive in nature and thus
violates ex post facto law when applied to previously convicted offenders); see
also State v. Wagoner, No. COA08-982, 2009 WL 2783449, at *9 (N.C. Ct. App.
Sept. 1, 2009) (Elmore, J., dissenting) (advocating that sex offender registration
scheme is punitive in nature).
251. See supra notes 65-76 and accompanying text (reviewing the changes in
the laws on drunk driving).
252. See GLADWELL, supra note 1, at 22 (describing the change in the pandemic
of 1918).
253. See GOUDSMIT, supra note 25, at 37-42.
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With a public clamoring for harsher punishments, and
a Court that has yet to establish parameters on due process,
it is not surprising that this subsequent generation of laws
has grown more aggressive. The old adage “give an inch,
they will take a mile”254 comes to mind in thinking of the
actions of legislators who, under the guise of a nonpunitive
alternative purpose, are imposing increasingly harsh
regiments for the convicted sex offender. The second
generation of registration schemes includes: residency
restriction statutes,255 GPS (Global Positioning Systems)
monitoring of sex offenders,256 expansion of the list of
registerable offenses,257 and harsher sentences for sex
offenses.258
And in an interesting twist, Three Strikes Law suffered
from runaway legislation before the original legislation was
finalized. Indeed, in a fairly public dispute, the Klaas family
distanced itself from Mike Reynolds and the final version of

254. CHRISTINE AMMER, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF IDIOMS 247-48
(1997).
255. Over twenty states have residency restriction statutes. See Logan, supra
note 188, at 6-7 (summarizing residency restriction laws). For examination of
the legitimacy of residency restrictions, see Douard, supra note 188, at 45,
decrying residency restrictions as an example of scapegoating; Joseph L. Lester,
Off to Elba! The Legitimacy of Sex Offender Residence and Employment
Restrictions, 40 AKRON L. REV. 339, 366-67 (2007), who contends that residency
restrictions impose a physical restraint under the Mendoza-Martinez test;
Logan, supra note 188; Asmara Tekle-Johnson, In the Zone: Sex Offenders and
the Ten-Percent Solutions, 94 IOWA L. REV. 607, 610-15 (2009), who contends
that residency restrictions are ineffective; Corey Rayburn Yung, Banishment by
a Thousand Laws: Residency Restrictions on Sex Offenders, 85 WASH. U. L. REV.
101, 103 (2007), who analogizes the historical practice of banishment to
exclusion zone laws; and Timothy Zick, Constitutional Displacement, 86 WASH.
U. L. REV. 515, 562 (2009), who depicts the banishment of sex offenders as the
“Geography of Membership.”
256. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 3000.07 (West Supp. 2009).
257. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 220, 290, 311.11 (West 2008 & Supp. 2009).
Sometimes a court rejects the application of sex offender status to the crime
charged. See State v. Robinson, 873 So. 2d 1205, 1217 (Fla. 2004) (disallowing
sex offender classification to carjacker who did not know that child was asleep in
the car).
258. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 220, 264, 286, 288(a) (West Supp. 2009).
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the Three Strikes Law because of concern over its newfound
breadth and scope.259
1. The New Generation of Residency Restrictions. In
particular, residency restrictions, which prohibit convicted
sex offenders from residing near designated locations
“where children congregate”260 have grown increasingly
harsh. When first introduced in the 1990s, the buffer zone
for the restriction was generally 1000 feet or less;261 but
today, more state and local governments have revised, or
attempted to revise, their residency restrictions to include
buffer zones of up to 2500 feet.262 In addition, some states
have expanded the term “where children congregate” from
the traditional—schools, day care centers, and parks—to a
much broader view of the term, including: bus stops,263 video

259. See Dan Morain, Proposition 184—’Three Strikes’: A Steamroller Driven
by One Man’s Pain, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1994, at A3 (revealing that Mark Klaas
was trying to defeat Three Strikes because of its breadth and scope).
260. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(3)(b) (West Supp. 2009) (prohibiting
sex offenders from living within 1000 feet of a school, day care center, or area
where minors congregate); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-9.4(b-5) (2002) (barring sex
offenders from living within 500 feet of a playground, child care centers, or
facilities that offer programs for children).
261. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1112 (Supp. 2007) (preventing sex
offenders from living within 500 feet of school property); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 28.733(f) (West Supp. 2009) (defining student safety zones as “1,000 feet or
less from school property”); see also Logan, supra note 188, at 6-7 (stating that
the average buffer zone in 2006 was 1,000 feet).
262. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-20-26(a) (LexisNexis 2008) (revising buffer zone
from 1000 feet to 2000 feet); CAL. PENAL CODE § 3003.5 (West Supp. 2009)
(increasing residency restriction to 2000 feet under Jessica’s Law); accord A.C.A
§ 5-14-128(a) (2009); OKLA. ST. tit. 57, § 590A (Supp. 2008); see also Press
Release, N.J. Assembly Republicans, Casagrande Calls for Immediate Action on
Sex Offender Bills following Court Ruling that Invalidates Local Ordinances
(May 7, 2009), http://www.njassemblyrepublicans.com/press_release.php?id=748
(reporting on attempts to prohibit high and moderate-risk sex offenders from
living within 2500 feet of schools, child care centers, or parks); Kelly Monitz, Sex
Offender Laws Face Challenge, STANDARD—SPEAKER (Hazelton, Pa.), Apr. 4,
2009, at A1 (discussing Alleghany County’s attempt to prevent sex offenders
from living within 2500 feet of schools, parks and child care facilities).
263. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(3) (West Supp. 2009) (amending law to
include bus stops); accord H.R. 4323, 2006 Gen. Assembly, 116th Sess. (S.C.
2006) (prohibiting certain sex offenders from residing within 1000 feet of bus
stops).
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arcade centers,264 and libraries.265 The effect is two-fold.
First, larger buffer zones with more points of reference
effectively freeze out most sex offenders from any
community.266 Second, the enactment of harsher residency
restrictions in one locale creates a domino effect as
communities engage in a competitive “race to the harshest”
to enact stricter residency restrictions than neighboring
jurisdictions.267 And the fallout of the “race to the harshest”
is that communities with less stringent residency
restrictions are finding that sex offenders are moving to
their neighborhoods simply “because they can find no other
place to live.”268
Probably the first “sticky message” to capture public
attention on the punitive nature of residency restrictions is
news of released offenders forced to live in makeshift tents
without electricity or heat under the Julia Tuttle Causeway
in Miami’s Biscayne Bay.269 Depicted as “a place so surreal
and outlandish,”270 the news of these living conditions
provided a new enduring message of ostracism and isolation
sex offenders face.

264. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.1(2) (2004) (adding free-standing video
arcades to the list of locations).
265. See. H.R. 7621, 2006 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2006) (barring child
predators from residing within 500 feet of day cares, schools, public parks,
playgrounds, and libraries).
266. The stories of ostracized offenders are numerous. See, e.g., Carol DeMare,
Efforts to Protect Kids Often Carry Own Risks, TIMES UNION (Albany, N.Y.),
Sept. 9, 2007, at A1 (describing the travails of one offender who moved and was
unable, because of residency restrictions, to find housing of any kind); Catharine
Skipp & Arian Campo-Flores, A Bridge Too Far, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 3, 2009, at 46
(reporting on displaced persons around the country).
267. See, e.g., Brandon Bain, What If There’s No Space? Residency Limits on
Sex Offenders May Need to be Adjusted, NEWSDAY (Long Island), Nov. 23, 2006,
at A18; John Pain, Miami Sex Offenders Get OK to Live Under a Bridge, CHI.
TRIB., Apr. 7, 2007, at 4; see also Jill S. Levenson, Restricting Sex Offender
Residences: Policy Implications, HUM. RTS., Spring 2009, at 21-22
(acknowledging that most residents live in proximity to locations prohibited to
sex offenders).
268. Michael Beebe, Nowhere to Go, Sex Offenders Come Here, BUFFALO NEWS,
Sept. 5, 2007, at A1.
269. See Skipp & Campo-Flores, supra note 266, at 48.
270. Id. at 48-49.
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But that situation, while extreme, is not unique. In
Suffolk County, New York, homeless offenders “were
crammed into a trailer that periodically moved around until
finally settling on the grounds of the county jail.”271 In
California, following the enactment of “Jessica’s Law,”
stricter residency restrictions have caused hundreds of
offenders to be made newly homeless.272
Clearly, the public intends the isolation. It intends to
force sex offenders to live anywhere but in their own
communities. But there are also unintended consequences
to these laws. Forced out of the communities, many
offenders are unable to secure the support services which
are mandated in their release.273 Additionally, states with
strict residency restrictions have seen a drop in registration.
Offenders, fearful that they cannot meet the residency
restriction
requirements,
would
rather
face
the
consequences of failing to register than the struggle to find
shelter under harsher residency restrictions.274
2. Proposed Legislation. A review of proposed legislation
suggests that we have yet to peak in the proliferation of sex
offender legislation. A sample of the bills in Congress
includes no parole for sex offenders and sexually violent
predators,275 required notice to foreign countries upon the
intended travel of a convicted high-risk sex offender,276
withdrawal of funding to states that do not have adequate
protection against pre-trial release of violent or serious sex
crimes,277 funding for the implementation of the Sex
271. Id. at 49.
272. See Bill Ainsworth, Law Creates Homeless Parolees, Report Says: Sex
Offenders Limited by Residency Rules, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Feb. 22, 2008, at
A1 (examining the plight of registered offenders to find housing); see also Lyda
Longa, Clusters of Shame: Laws Force Some Sex Offenders into Motels, onto
Streets, DAYTONA NEWS-J., Jan. 11, 2009, 1A (reporting that many sex offenders
live in the woods or in their cars).
273. See Barbara R. Keshen, Sex Offender Residency Limits Don’t Make Kids
Safer, CONCORD MONITOR, Mar. 6, 2009, at A9 (arguing that stricter New
Hampshire residency restrictions will have negative implications).
274. See Larry Sandler, Corrections Officials Speak Against Sex Offender
Proposal, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 29, 2007, at 6B (expressing concern
over the drop in registration in Iowa).
275. No Parole for Sex Offenders Act, H.R. 1375, 111th Cong. (2009).
276. International Megan’s Law of 2009, H.R. 1623, 111th Cong. (2009).
277. Protecting America’s Children Act of 2009, H.R. 2674, 111th Cong. (2009).
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Offender Registration Tips and Crime Victims Center
Programs,278 and withdrawal of burial related benefits and
funeral honors for certain convicted sex offenders.279
State legislative bills have been equally expansive. In
an attempt to curtail sex offenders’ activity on the Internet,
a New York law has been proposed that would post personal
information about convicted offenders on social networking
sites such as MySpace and would curtail the amount of time
an offender may surf the Internet,280 and another proposal
would prohibit sex offenders from visiting nursing homes or
donning Santa’s costumes.281
B. The “Too Sticky” Message
Emotion-laden rhetoric is one hallmark of a legislative
epidemic. It is, of course, the stickiness of this particular
style of message that catalyzes a spread. However, this style
of communication often resorts to broadly painted
generalizations that are less intended for their truths than
for their ability to inspire action. In the case of sex offender
registration laws, there are several such messages: “all
convicted sex offenders are predators,” “all convicted sex
offenders reoffend,” “no convicted sex offender can be
trusted to live in our neighborhoods,” and “our communities
must have these laws to protect us.”
But what happens when the sticky message becomes too
sticky? What happens when these generalized statements
are repeated so often that they become embedded in the
jurisprudence without pause for reexamination? One of the
more disturbing realities of a legislative epidemic based on
this type of rhetoric is that sometimes the underlying
“truths” that initially compel the message turn out to be
false. Or, they are misleading and inaccurate because they
are based on sweeping generalizations. This was the caution
sounded by historian Jenkins who wrote that a hallmark of
278. Sex Offender Registration Tips Program Act of 2009, H.R. 2612, 111th
Cong. (2009).
279. Jenny’s Law, H.R. 731, 111th Cong. (2009).
280. See Erik German, Safer Social Networking, NEWSDAY (Long Island), Jan.
30, 2008, at A7.
281. Kevin McDermott, The Battle Over Tracking Sex Offenders: Too Tough?,
PANTAGRAPH (Bloomington, Ill.), Mar. 1, 2009, at A1.
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a societal panic is “when ‘experts,’” in the form of police
chiefs, the judiciary, politicians and editors “perceive the
threat in all but identical terms.”282
Ultimately, this may have also been the biggest failing
of the Court in Connecticut Department of Public Safety,
which sanctioned Connecticut’s inclusion of all sex offenders
in its Internet registry without regard to whether they were
dangerous, or whether there was a likelihood of reoffense.
In doing so, the Court promoted one of the generalizations:
a state could treat all sex offenders alike because all sex
offenders are alike.
There are potentially other false messages that are so
deeply entrenched in sex offender legislation that it will be
difficult to lessen their impact or excise the sentiments from
the jurisprudence. First is the claim that sex offenders
recidivate in larger numbers than other offenders. In Doe v.
Poritz, the New Jersey Supreme Court endorsed studies
that reported recidivism rates of sex offenders at upwards of
40% to 52%.283 The United States Supreme Court applied
the Poritz gloss in Smith to conclude that recidivism posed
by sex offenders generally is “‘frightening and high.’”284 Yet,
Bureau of Justice Statistics for roughly the same timeframe
as Poritz do not support the conclusion that sex offenders
recidivate more than non-sex offenders. “Of the 9,691 male
sex offenders released from prisons in 15 States in 1994,
5.3% were rearrested for a new sex crime within 3 years of
release.”285 In fact, sex offenders were “less likely than nonsex offenders to be rearrested for any offense––43 percent of

282. See JENKINS, supra note 187, at 6.
283. Doe v. Portiz, 662 A.2d 367, 374-75 (N.J. 1995); see also E.B. v. Verniero,
119 F.3d 1077, 1097 n.17 (3d Cir. 1997) (“Heinous crimes have been committed
against children after release from incarceration.”); State v. Druktenis, 86 P.3d
1050, 1068 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004) (“[S]ex offenders pose a significant risk of
recidivism.”); State v. Sakobie, 598 S.E.2d 615, 617 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (“The
purpose of [the state’s sex offender registration law] is to prevent recidivism
because ‘sex offenders often pose a high risk of [reoffense] and . . . protection of
the public from sex offenders is of paramount governmental interest.’” (quoting
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-208.5 (2003))).
284. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 103 (2003) (quoting McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S.
24, 34 (2002)).
285. See
U.S.
Dep’t
of
Justice,
Criminal
Offender
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/crimoff.htm# (last visited Dec. 6, 2009).
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sex offenders versus 68 percent of non-sex offenders.”286 And
in a separate study detailing 272,111 former inmates who
were discharged in 1994, the lowest re-arrest rates were for
those previously in prison for homicide or rape, while the
highest reoffense rate were for those previously convicted of
property crimes.287
Why the disparity in statistics? As cautioned by two
commentators, “[c]ollapsing all sex offenders together into a
single category and making generalizations about this
diverse range of offenders . . . is likely to result in
substantial mischaracterization regarding the risk of reoffending for many of these individuals.”288 Yet still, global
assumptions about sex offender laws retain their stickiness
even in the face of contradicting facts.289 A local politician’s
statement highlights the enduring nature of this message,
“I’d rather err on the side of keeping sex offenders as far
away from our children as possible than worry about what
an expert who doesn’t live in my village has to say.”290
In equal doubt is whether sex offender registration laws
actually work.291 Despite the persistent statements that
expansive sex offender registration laws are essential tools
to protect the community, there may be little truth to these
286. Id.
287. PATRICK A. LANGAN & DAVID J. LEVIN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM
PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994 (2002), cited with approval in Ewing v.
California, 538 U.S. 11, 26 (2003).
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288. Adam Shajnfeld & Richard B. Krueger, Reforming (Purportedly) Nonpunitive Responses to Sexual Offending, 25 DEV. MENTAL HEALTH L. 81, 83
(2006).
289. Id. (positing reasons to reject blanket statements about sex offenders). In
HIV/AIDS legislation, one commentator has questioned whether criminal laws
of transmission should be reexamined because the medical nature of the disease
has changed. See James B. McArthur, Note, As the Tide Turns: The Changing
HIV/AIDS Epidemic and the Criminalization of HIV Exposure, 94 CORNELL L.
REV. 707 (2009).
290. Erik German, Sex Offenders Face Tighter Rules, NEWSDAY (Long Island),
Dec. 5, 2006, at A42.
291. The case of registered sex offender Phillip Garrido is instructive. Despite
his registration for rape and kidnapping following his conviction in the 1970s,
Mr. Garrido nonetheless was able to kidnap eleven-year-old Jaycee Lee Dugard
and hold her for eighteen years undetected, all the while fulfilling his
registration requirements. See Monica Davey, Plenty of Data on Sex Offenses,
but Registries Are Just a Start, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2009, at A1.
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“too sticky” messages. One recent study, for example, found
no evidence of reduction in sexual offending since
registration schemes were adopted.292 In fact, the study
questions the use of significant resources to track previously
convicted offenders when 95% of sex offenses are committed
by “first-time” offenders not yet in the system.293
With respect to residency restrictions, in particular, one
study from Florida found that sex offenders who live closer
to schools or day care centers do not reoffend more often
than those who do not live in the vicinity.294 This research
underscores the disquieting realization that residency
restrictions may offer no purpose other than to placate a
fearful public indoctrinated by the message.
C. Lofty Goals and Loftier Price Tags
Sweeping criminal legislation, in itself, is not inherently
bad. Witness the change in the 1980s on drinking and
drunk driving laws,295 or the laws to curtail cell phone use
while driving.296 Each was a measured response to perceived
problematic behaviors. However, because of hyperbolic and
hasty
beginnings,
certain
legislation
cannot
be
characterized as measured responses, and their expansive
promises sometimes lead to the inability to fulfill their prepassage goals.
Herein often lies their undoing, as is true of both sex
offender registration laws and California’s Three Strikes
Law, neither of which have been able to financially sustain
their ambitious beginnings. For California’s Three Strikes
Law, there is unprecedented economic fall-out from the
sentencing reform it engendered. California’s burgeoning
prison population—from 78,000 to 170,000 in twenty
years—is attributed in large measure to the longer prison
sentences convicted offenders receive as a result of its Three

292. Sandler et al., supra note 160, at 299 (concluding that statistics do not
support a positive impact from registration schemes).
293. Id. at 297.
294. See Levenson, supra note 267, at 21 (reporting studies that find no
correlation between where the offender lives and the abuse).
295. See supra notes 65-76 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
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Strikes Law.297 In 2008, more than $11 billion was spent in
California on incarceration, second in general fund
expenditure only to education costs for K-12 grades.298 A
2005 report from the Legislative Analyst’s Office estimates
that the annual cost of housing all three-strikes inmates is
$500 million, and it is reported that “of the more than
40,000 California inmates incarcerated under three strikes,
more than half were convicted of nonviolent felonies.”299 It
should have come as no surprise that with a growing prison
population and no additional facilities to house it, prison
conditions would rapidly deteriorate. Indeed, the Little
Hoover Commission wrote, “California’s correctional system
is in a tailspin.”300
In 2009, a three-judge panel ruled that prison
overcrowding was at such dangerous levels, and the health
care so grossly inadequate, that incarceration violates basic
constitutional rights.301 At the heart of the downward spiral
of California’s prison system, some argue, is the enactment
of its expansive Three Strikes Law, whose price tag could
not be sustained without significant consequences.302
So compelling can be the push, that legislation is
sometimes passed without sufficient money to fund it. This
is true of the subsequent generation of sex offender
registration schemes. Members of Congress, for example,
have openly acknowledged that many programs of the
Adam Walsh Act have been underfunded or never funded at
297. Michael Rothfeld, Prison Cuts Easier Said than Done, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
23, 2009, at A1 (providing statistics on increase in prison population and the
budget for incarceration).
298. Editorial, Forcing Their Hands: Budget Crisis Pushes Governor and
Lawmakers on Prison Reform, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., May 17, 2009, at F2.
299. Editorial, A Simple Fix: Paperwork Crimes Don’t Warrant Third Strikes,
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Jan. 20, 2009, at B7 (citing the report to argue for
change in which crimes trigger the Three Strikes Law).
300. LITTLE HOOVER COMM’N, SOLVING CALIFORNIA’S CORRECTION CRISIS, at i
(2007), http://www.lhc.ca.gov/studies/185/Report185.pdf.
301. Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P, 2009 WL
2430820, at *115 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2009). California has been ordered to reduce
its incarcerated population up to forty percent within two or three years in order
to relieve severe overcrowding. Id. at *116.
302. See Editorial, Court Order Should Prod State to Begin Prison Reform,
ALAMEDA TIMES-STAR (Oakland, Cal.), Aug. 9, 2009, at A14 (linking California’s
Three Strikes Law to the worsening prison conditions).

2010]

LEGISLATIVE EPIDEMICS

61

all.303 In Jessica’s Law, GPS monitoring and stricter
residency restrictions are facing similar financial
constraints. Although GPS monitoring of sex offenders is
believed to be an important enforcement tool,304 some are
openly questioning the ability to finance this technology.305
And stricter residency restrictions have put serious
financial strain on governmental agencies unable to find
suitable and inexpensive permanent housing for released
offenders.306
There are other serious drawbacks to sweeping
legislation that have financial implications to be sure. The
Adam Walsh Act, for example, has drawn sharp criticism
from various sectors who contend that states cannot comply
with the behemoth set of mandatory obligations.307 In fact,
as of 2009, no state has been able to comply with the Act’s
requirements—so comprehensive and grand in scale is the
Act.308

303. See, e.g., 154 CONG. REC. S9352 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 2008) (statement of
Sen. Coburn) (“We promised everybody we would do it, but have barely funded it
at all.”); accord 155 CONG. REC. E611 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 2009) (statement of
Rep. Smith) (“Unfortunately, many of the programs authorized by the Adam
Walsh Act . . . have received insufficient or no direct funding from Congress.”);
154 CONG. REC. S4588-89 (daily ed. May 21, 2008) (statement of Sen. Hatch)
(“Unfortunately, many of the enforcement provisions in the Adam Walsh Act
have not been funded . . . .”).
304. See, e.g., Christian Nolan, GPS Tracking Gets Cautious Endorsement,
CONN. L. TRIB., Nov. 24, 2008, at 1; Jennifer Sullivan, Sex Offenders Get
Tracking Bracelets, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 2, 2008, at B6 (observing that GPS
monitoring will improve public safety).
305. See, e.g., Mark Pitsch, Eyes on Sex Offenders: Sometimes, or Always?, WIS.
ST. J., Mar. 1, 2009, at A1 (reporting on budget cuts proposed by Wisconsin
governor to change nature of monitoring).
306. See Ainsworth, supra note 272; see also Paul Eakins, Offender Law Draws
Criticism, LONG BEACH PRESS-TELEGRAM (Cal.), Mar. 13, 2008, at 1A (quoting an
official for the State Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation).
307. See, e.g., SONRA, supra note 197, at 52-59 (statement of Emma Devillier,
Att’y Gen. of La.).
308. See id. at 74-85 (statement of Ernie Allen, President & CEO, Nat’l Ctr. for
Missing & Exploited Children); see also Jolynne M. Hudnell, No State in
Compliance with Adam Walsh Act as Deadline Approaches, ASSOCIATED
CONTENT, June 21, 2009, http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/1831723/no
_state_in_compliance_with_adam_walsh_pg3.html?cat=17.
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IV. RESPONDING TO RUNAWAY EPIDEMICS
Sweeping legislation that is built on emotional rhetoric
is hard to corral. Legislators are unlikely to champion
retrenchment because of election defeats they risk,309 and
courts are hesitant to reign in legislative actions because of
a historical deference to legislative intent. Yet, runaway
epidemics beg for responses by these two participants.
A. Judicial Pushback
In the area of sex offender registration, slowly, there are
stirrings of backlash to the judicial endorsement of sex
offender registration laws as nonpunitive civil remedies.310
One recent decision stands out. In a thoughtful examination
of the Mendoza-Martinez “intent-effects” test, the Indiana
Supreme Court in Wallace v. State concluded that Indiana’s
Sex Offender Registration Act violates the ex post facto
clause
of
the
Indiana
Constitution.311
Although
acknowledging that the Indiana and United States
constitutions are similarly worded,312 the Indiana Supreme
Court applied “an independent analysis”313 to determine
that Indiana’s amended sex offender registration scheme is
punitive in nature without a sufficient alternative
nonpunitive purpose.314 In what can only be viewed as a
rejection of Smith when applied to current sex offender
registration laws, the Wallace court found that it violates ex
309. A prime example is the inaction of California lawmakers to respond to the
worsening prison crisis, even in the face of reports over the last decade that
demanded action. See Editorial, supra note 298 (decrying that legislators
received five separate reports from the Hoover Commission explaining the
deplorable conditions in prison, yet did nothing in response); see also supra
notes 200-05 and accompanying text.
310. See e.g., Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 383-84 (Ind. 2009) (concluding
that Indiana’s sex offender registration scheme is punitive in nature); see also
Editorial, Revisit Jessica’s Law, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2009, at A16; Eric Russell,
Court to Shape Sex Offender Registry Debate, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Feb. 23,
2009, at A1 (commenting on potential changes in Maine’s sex offender registry
law to distinguish between violent and nonviolent offenders).
311. Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 379-84.
312. Id. at 377-78.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 383-84.
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post facto law to subject previously convicted offenders to
the newly-amended and increasingly harsh registration
scheme.315
Of particular sway was the court’s denunciation of a
system that does not differentiate among sex offenders.316 It
is the sticky message, upon which this particular legislative
epidemic is founded—that all sex offenders, no matter the
nature of their conviction, pose a significant risk of
recidivism. But this is a message Wallace roundly criticizes.
Disapproving of this view, the court found that the Indiana
registration scheme is fundamentally flawed because it is
“so broad and sweeping.”317 Despite endorsement in
Connecticut Department of Public Safety to treat all sex
offenders alike for purposes of inclusion in the state
registry, the Indiana court is not alone in rejecting the
underlying premise. Other jurisdictions are also questioning
the legitimacy of sweeping sex offender registration
schemes that ensnare the violent and nonviolent alike in a
“one-size-fits-all” approach.318
Also of note is the inconsequential role that legislative
intent ultimately played in the court’s analysis. Unlike
Smith, which relied on Alaska’s legislative intent to create a
civil remedy, the Indiana Supreme Court ruled that, even
assuming the legislature had a nonpunitive purpose in
drafting the Indiana registration scheme,319 analysis of the
other Mendoza-Martinez elements clearly demonstrates
that the Act is punitive in nature. Writing for the
315. Id. at 384; see also Doe v. Schwarzenegger, 476 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1179
(E.D. Cal. 2007) (ordering California’s Jessica’s Law to be applied only
prospectively); Commonwealth v. Cory, 911 N.E.2d 187 (Mass. 2009) (concluding
that retroactive application of Massachusetts statute requiring GPS monitoring
of sex offender on probation violates ex post facto).
316. Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 381-82; see also Dowdell v. City of Jeffersonville,
907 N.E.2d 559, 562, 571 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (finding that, as applied to this
defendant, prohibition for this sex offender to enter park violates ex post facto
clause of the Indiana Constitution).
317. Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 384.
318. See Russell, supra note 310, at A1 (commenting on potential changes in
Maine’s sex offender registry law to distinguish between violent and nonviolent
offenders).
319. Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 379 (“[A]ssuming without deciding that the
Legislature intended the Act to be non-punitive, we conclude its effects are
nonetheless punitive as to appellant Wallace.”).
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unanimous court, Justice Rucker stated, “the Act violates
the prohibition on ex post facto laws . . . because it imposes
burdens that have the effect of adding punishment beyond
that which could have been imposed when his crime was
committed.”320
Ramped-up residency restrictions are facing greater
scrutiny as well. In both Indiana and Georgia, increased
residency restrictions have been invalidated. In State v.
Pollard, the Indiana Supreme Court incorporated the
analytical structure of Wallace to conclude that, as applied
to defendant, amended residency restrictions under the
Indiana Sex Offender Registration Act violate ex post facto
law because of their punitive effect.321 As in Wallace, the
court reproved residency restrictions that were so broadly
created that they applied with equal force to those convicted
of serious and minor sexual offenses.322 Echoing the
reasoning of Wallace, the court wrote, “Restricting the
residence of offenders based on conduct that may have
nothing to do with crimes against children, and without
considering whether a particular offender is a danger to the
general public, the statute exceeds its non-punitive
purposes.”323
In Mann v. Georgia Department of Corrections, the
Georgia Supreme Court faced whether residency
restrictions are constitutional under slightly different legal
circumstances.324 The court was presented with a “Takings
Clause” challenge by a registered sex offender who was
forced to move from his home because a child care facility
moved in within 1000 feet of his residence.325 The court
wrote, “[I]t is apparent that there is no place in Georgia
where a registered sex offender can live without being

320. Id. at 384.
321. State v. Pollard, 908 N.E.2d 1145, 1150-53 (Ind. 2009) (articulating under
the Mendoza-Martinez test the reasons that Indiana’s residency restrictions
were punitive in effect).
322. Id. at 1153 (repudiating the application of residency restrictions to those
convicted of Class D felonies in the same manner as those convicted of Class A
felonies).
323. Id.
324. Mann v. Ga. Dep’t of Corrs., 653 S.E.2d 740 (Ga. 2007).
325. Id. at 741-42.
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continually at risk of being ejected.”326 Unlike other states,
Georgia does not have a “move-to-the-offender” exception
where registered offenders are not forced to leave when
prohibited facilities move within the restricted area.
Consequently, Georgia offenders “face the possibility of
being repeatedly uprooted and forced to abandon homes in
order to comply with the restrictions . . . .”327 Although based
on a small aspect of residency restrictions—whether the
residency restriction is unconstitutional because Georgia
does not offer an exception when facilities move to an
offender—the broad-based language of the opinion portends
other similar results.
B. Governmental Action
So punitive are some new laws that, even without
judicial intervention, government officials are redefining
parameters to circumvent some of their harshest aspects. In
California, for example, immediately following passage of
Jessica’s Law in 2006, then-Attorney General Bill Lockyer
reported his intention to apply the law only prospectively.328
By not applying the law retroactively, 90,000 sex offenders
would not be forced to relocate because of more expansive
buffer zones.329 It is an informal application of ex post facto
law, if you will.
The Three Strikes Law also underwent informal and ad
hoc revision when it was first enacted. Because the breadth
of strike-eligible offenses include more than 500 crimes,
many of which are nonviolent, prosecutors and judges alike
tried, in an ad hoc manner, to craft ways around the newly
enacted law.330 Consequently, in the first six months after
passage, only one in six eligible offenders was sent to prison
for the proscribed twenty-five years to life.331 The unofficial
326. Id. at 742.
327. Id. (comparing jurisdictions that have exceptions in their residency
restrictions).
328. Denny Walsh, Sexual Predator Law Again Targeted, SACRAMENTO BEE,
Nov. 17, 2006, at A3.
329. See Editorial, Lockyer’s Curveball on Prop 83 Baffles Bench, ALAMEDA
TIMES-STAR (Oakland, Cal.), Dec. 3, 2006, at Metro 5.
330. Richard Lee Colvin & Ted Rohrlich, Courts Toss Curveballs to ‘3 Strikes,’
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1994, at A1.
331. Id.
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prosecutorial responses to the newly enacted legislation
were formalized in 2000 under the new administration in
the District Attorney’s Office in Los Angeles as prosecutors
were instructed to avoid seeking three strike sentences for
minor, nonviolent offenses.332
CONCLUSION
In theory, legislative epidemics serve an important
function in the evolution of criminal jurisprudence. When
properly conceived and executed, the epidemic provides a
common framework of language for national decisionmaking
to address the tip of the problem. Such was the case of
drunk driving laws, which, over a generation, produced
legislation on a variety of fronts to address the problem of
drinking and driving.
However, for sex offender registration laws and Three
Strikes, it is a cautionary tale of criminal laws created from
haste and emotion. Fueled by high-profile cases, emotionladen rhetoric, and inaccurate assumptions about crime and
criminals, these epidemics have proliferated without
sufficient check by lawmakers and courts.
The difficulties are apparent, the solution less so.
Legislators are disinclined to slow the escalation because of
election risks they face, and courts have been hesitant to
intervene because of a historical deference they give to
legislative intent. But as this Article has demonstrated,
both lawmakers and the judiciary—major participants in
the spread of legislation—must acknowledge their
responsibilities to provide parameters to these popular, yet
unbridled, laws.
But seeking retrenchment from the legislature on issues
affecting crime may be a foolhardy undertaking—tilting at
windmills, perhaps. The deteriorating California prison
system offers an excellent example of a legislative epidemic
that swelled out of control without hope of intervention by
its lawmakers. Despite state-authorized reports about
overcrowding and anecdotal stories of the deplorable
conditions in the prisons, the California legislature failed to
take ameliorative action. Indeed, even armed with this
332. See Steve Berry, Cooley’s First Year Produces Few Highs or Lows, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 3, 2001, at B1.
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knowledge, California lawmakers continued to sponsor
criminal legislation that would further tax an overcrowded
prison system.333 Action could only occur because the court
intervened.
Because of the emotionally charged nature of some
legislative epidemics, judicial intervention may be the only
realistic response. The Indiana Supreme Court’s decisions
in Wallace and Pollard are not only dispositive for its state’s
registration scheme, the opinions also offer instructive
guidance to courts in other jurisdictions seeking to craft
measured responses to escalating sex offender registration
laws.
In the end, however, where the legislative epidemic
produces runaway legislation, it may be that judicial
response at the state level is insufficient to change the
direction of the national conversation. Lawrence v. Texas334
reminds us of this lesson regarding criminalizing
consensual sexual conduct. In the case of sex offender
registration laws, Wallace sounds a clarion call to the
United States Supreme Court to review the constitutional
parameters of these increasingly harsh laws: to tip the
epidemic in the other direction.

333. Editorial, supra note 302 (recounting legislative refusal to take
ameliorative action while continuing to sponsor measures).
334. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).

